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ABSTRACT 
Developments over the past thirty years have contributed to increased natural gas 
generation in the US electricity sector. As a result, natural gas generation surpassed coal for the 
first time in history in 2016. In addition to low natural gas prices, developments with the natural 
gas-fired combined cycle generator (NGCC) have contributed to the rise of natural gas. In the 
1990s, technological innovations led to substantial efficiency gains for NGCC, rendering these 
generators cleaner and more efficient than other widely available sources of power generation 
during that period. In the early 2000s, the US experienced the largest short-term increase in 
generation capacity in history, with over 70% of this new capacity installed as NGCC. Initially, 
much of the new NGCC capacity only provided power when energy demand was at its highest. 
Since 2003, NGCC utilization has nearly doubled, and NGCC is increasingly used to provide 
baseload power. The purpose of this dissertation is to scrutinize these developments with NGCC 
to better understand how energy and environmental policies influenced the time and location of 
capacity changes, how this capacity has been used, and the role of technology on both. 
The first essay in this dissertation evaluates the impact of a government-sponsored 
research program on NGCC innovations in the 1990s. From 1992-2000, the Department of 
Energy partnered with two US turbine manufacturers, General Electric (GE) and Siemens 
Westinghouse Power Corporation (SWPC), in a cost-sharing program called the Advanced 
Turbine System to stimulate efficiency innovations for NGCC technology. Using data from the 
European Patent Office’s worldwide patent database (PATSTAT), I evaluate innovative activity 
in advanced turbine technology by the program participants and their competitors. Using a 
negative binomial model, I find GE increased the volume of their patents towards the end of the 
program and afterwards, while SWPC had higher patent citations for patents filed during the 
program relative to competitors. These observed changes in patenting activity merit further 
 
 
investigation into why these changes took place, and how the resulting patents translated into 
commercialized technologies in the US and abroad. 
The second essay evaluates the impact of policy anticipation on natural gas capacity 
growth during a time in which substantial natural gas capacity came online. I hypothesize that 
areas expecting nonattainment designations resulting from changes in the ozone and particulate 
matter National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) rushed to complete installations 
before new environmental regulations took place in 2004 and 2005. I use EIA and EPA data 
from 1997-2009 to evaluate the role of policy anticipation on capacity investment with 
difference-in-difference models. My results show areas expecting nonattainment designations 
had more natural gas capacity growth than areas not facing nonattainment, on the order of 10% 
for ozone and 13% for particulate matter, per year. This study thus finds that substantial 
investment in environmental technology may take place in anticipation of policy changes. 
 The third essay considers how this new natural gas capacity is being used. Recent climate 
regulations aim to increase utilization of NGCC generators to offset coal generation and, 
consequently, reduce carbon emissions. There have been substantial increases in utilization for 
some NGCC generators in the last ten years, but most remain below baseload levels. This paper 
examines the factors that have driven NGCC utilization to date. I use a random-effects model to 
evaluate the relationships between environmental policies and natural gas prices on NGCC 
utilization. I find that both low natural gas prices and cross-state air pollution policies drive 
increases in utilization; however, the size of the impact by the environmental policies depends on 
the age of the plant. I use the estimates from this model for a counterfactual analysis which 
reveals the cross-state air pollution policies have had nearly three times the impact of low natural 
gas prices on utilization from 2003-2014. 
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1 
CHAPTER ONE: 
Introduction 
 Changes in technological innovation, resource availability and prices, national security, 
environmental concerns, and politics jointly create a complex and dynamic environment at the 
nexus of energy and environmental issues. As a result, periods of significant change are common 
in the energy and environmental sector. Multifaceted developments over the last thirty years 
have contributed to important developments for natural gas-fired power plants. While coal 
generation was once the dominant source of electricity in the US, in 2016 natural gas generation 
surpassed coal for the first time in history.1 Since natural gas generation has lower direct 
emissions of conventional pollutants and carbon dioxide than coal, this substitution has had 
important consequences for the environment. The rise of natural gas generation is due in large 
part to hydraulic fracturing, which has been able to recover abundant domestic supplies of 
natural gas resulting in low natural gas prices since 2009. However, changes in natural gas 
generation technology, energy policy, and environmental policy have also played a part in the 
current natural gas revolution. Consequently, accounts focused solely on low natural gas prices2 
or President Obama’s Clean Power Plan3 for “killing” coal are mistaken. This dissertation 
focuses on several of these other developments contributing to the rise in natural gas generation. 
 The importance of factors other than natural gas prices can be seen in Figure 1. Figure 1 
shows the efficiency of coal versus natural gas in the US electricity sector since the early 1950s, 
                                                          
1 EIA Today from April 20, 2017: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=30872 
2 Newsweek article October 8, 2016, “Coal industry is dying, no matter what a President Trump would do.” 
Available at: http://www.newsweek.com/coal-industry-dying-no-matter-trump-507079 
3 Remarks by President Donald Trump signing the Executive Order to Create Energy Independence (March 28, 
2017): https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/28/remarks-president-trump-signing-executive-order-
create-energy  
   
 
2 
calculated as a ratio of actual energy output to fuel energy input.4 Until 2000, coal and natural 
gas efficiency were quite similar, but low. Average efficiencies for much of this time period 
hovered around 32%, meaning over two-thirds of the spent fuel was essentially wasted in 
electricity generation. Improved efficiency translates into lower emissions and lower costs as less 
fuel is lost in the process of making electricity. From 1950-1990, most natural gas generation 
came from steam-turbines and single-cycle gas turbines, with efficiencies around 30%.5 
However, in the 1990s, natural gas-fired combined cycle generators (NGCC), with efficiencies 
closer to 40-50%, became a more common source of natural gas generation. Beginning around 
2000, net natural gas efficiency markedly improved while coal efficiency remained flat. This 
efficiency improvement for natural gas is primarily due to developments that increased the 
presence and use of NGCC for power generation in place of less efficient steam and single-cycle 
gas turbines. 
 
Figure 1: Average efficiency of natural gas compared to coal in the US on an energy output: 
energy input basis. Computed using data from the Energy Information Administration (EIA).  
 An NGCC unit includes both a gas turbine and heat recovery steam turbine that reuses 
the waste heat from the gas turbine to generate additional electricity (Figure 2). In a single-cycle 
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5 EIA Today April 20, 2017, available at https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=30872. 
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3 
gas turbine the exhaust heat from the gas turbine escapes and goes unused. In NGCC, the reuse 
of waste heat to generate steam for a steam turbine makes the system more efficient. This 
dissertation discusses the three main developments with NGCC contributing to the overall rise of 
natural gas efficiency compared to coal: (1) technological improvements of NGCC generators, 
(2) rapid increase in NGCC capacity from 2000-2004, and (3) increased utilization of this 
capacity for power generation. 
 
Figure 2: NGCC generation process, courtesy of Rolling Hills Generating.6 
 The first essay (Chapter 2) explores the technological innovation of NGCC power plants, 
which has rendered them much more efficient than conventional coal-fired generators. This 
chapter describes the history of NGCC innovation and evaluates the impact of a Department of 
Energy program on NGCC innovation in the 1990s. The program, called the Advanced Turbine 
System program was a cost-sharing partnership with two NGCC turbine manufacturers, General 
Electric (GE) and Siemens Westinghouse Power Corporation (SWPC), to create new NGCC 
plants to reach 60% efficiency. I find that changes in patenting activity by the program 
                                                          
6 Image source: http://insights.globalspec.com/article/2895/combined-cycle-power-plants-is-their-reign-assured. 
   
 
4 
participants varied by company: GE experienced a statistically significant increase in patenting 
towards the end of the program, while SWPC had patents with higher citations for a few years 
early in the program. 
 The second essay (Chapter 3) considers changes in NGCC capacity in the US. This 
component is the largest contributor to the increase in net efficiency for natural gas shown in 
Figure 1. From 2000-2004, the US experienced what has been called the natural gas capacity 
boom, a period with the largest short-term increase in generation capacity in US history. As a 
result, NGCC became the dominant source of natural gas generation, and it is significantly more 
efficient than single-cycle gas turbines or gas-fired steam turbines. Chapter 3 explores the impact 
of environmental policies on determining where this new NGCC capacity was built. This study 
finds that anticipation of new environmental regulations to meet more stringent air quality 
standards played a statistically significant role in determining where new NGCC generators were 
built during this period.  
 The last factor contributing to this rise in natural gas efficiency is driven by how much 
the new, more efficient NGCC generators are run. Chapter 4 considers the impact of low natural 
gas prices and environmental policies on NGCC utilization. Until recently, the average NGCC 
plant operated approximately 20-30% of the time, providing power only when energy demand 
was high. However, low natural gas prices and air pollution policies doubled NGCC utilization 
to about 50% by 2014. This chapter uses a random-effects model to measure the impact of 
environmental policies versus low natural gas prices on NGCC utilization, finding that cross-
state air pollution policies had an effect three times the size of low natural gas prices on NGCC 
utilization. Chapter 5 summarizes the findings from Chapters 2-4, and the impacts these finding 
may have on the future for natural gas and directions for further research. 
   
 
5 
CHAPTER TWO: 
Natural Gas Combined Cycle Innovations in the US: The Impact of the Advanced Turbine 
System Program 
 
1. Introduction 
 In 2016, natural gas-fired generators provided just over 33% of all electricity generation 
in the US, surpassing coal-fired generation on an annual basis for the first time in history.7 While 
the increased use of natural gas for generation is attributable to many factors, one important 
aspect is the technological improvements rendering natural gas-fired combined cycle generators 
(NGCC) relatively clean, efficient, and cheap. Efficiency improvements by advanced NGCC 
generators have been described as “the most important efficiency gains in electricity generation 
in modern times” (Newell, 2011). Since the inception of NGCC in the early 1940s, efficiencies 
of the system have vastly improved from 25% to 62% percent by 2016.8 According to a 
Department of Energy (DOE) study by Michael Curtis (2003), an increase of a single percent 
point in thermal efficiency for a typical-sized NGCC plant (400-500 MW) can reduce operating 
costs by as much as $20 million over the life of the plant.  
 The Curtis study suggests that NGCC efficiencies increased substantially during the time 
period of the DOE’s Advanced Turbine System (DOE-ATS) program from 1992-2000. The 
program was a cost-sharing, public-private partnership with two domestic natural gas 
manufacturers, General Electric (GE) and Siemens Westinghouse Power Corporation (SWPC), 
to improve performance of gas turbines and NGCC beyond the current technological limits at 
that time. DOE provided a total of $315 million and its private sector partners provided an 
                                                          
7 Which can be seen using Energy Information Administration’s Electricity Data Browser, available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser. 
8 The1940s NGCC efficiency statistic is provided by Hirsch (1999), and the GE 7HA NGCC product line brochure 
provides the latest efficiency statistic, available at https://powergen.gepower.com/products/heavy-duty-gas-
turbines/7ha-gas-turbine.html. 
   
 
6 
additional $155 million (National Research Council, 2001). The National Research Council 
(2001) argues that “DOE has been instrumental in accelerating the highly cost-shared 
development of gas turbines that have both high efficiencies and low NOx [nitrogen oxide] 
emissions.” Curtis describes the innovations during the program as “breakthrough” and 
“transitional” for leading to the development of complex technologies significantly different 
from their predecessors (2003). 
 There are various reasons and means for government to sponsor research and 
development (R&D), and different degrees of success have been determined in the evaluation 
and review of these programs (David et al., 2000). DOE created the ATS program to overcome 
market failures created by deregulation of the electricity industry and low natural gas prices, 
which had been barriers to private R&D by domestic suppliers of electric generation equipment. 
A second objective was increased energy independence, amidst a renewed interest in energy 
security. Additionally, the program aimed to stimulate US competitiveness against foreign 
manufacturers by producing cleaner, more efficient, and lower cost gas turbines and NGCC 
generators (Curtis, 2003).  
 Curtis also states that interviews with industry members involved with DOE-ATS 
indicated that this type of research was not previously being done in the US, and that the 
program advanced turbine innovations by 5-10 years. He describes the program as a successful 
public-private partnership because the two turbine manufacturers commercialized turbines 
meeting the program objectives during or shortly after the program (Curtis 2003).  
 The focus on direct outputs by the program, in this case commercialized technology, does 
not address the common concern regarding public R&D programs, which is that they substitute 
for private R&D that would otherwise take place (David et al., 2000). Government programs 
   
 
7 
such as this one are often derided as “corporate welfare,” with low social benefit but high private 
returns for the companies involved. Therefore, it is useful to study the innovative activity in this 
field before and after the program by the program participants and their competitors for a more 
informative determination of the program impact. 
 As a measure of innovation, I compare patenting activity by the two companies involved 
with the program to other firms patenting in these fields during the same period. Through 
econometric analysis using patent and citation counts, I evaluate the claims that the program 
advanced innovation for the participants relative to their competitors. I find that GE and SWPC 
responded somewhat differently to the program in terms of quantity and impact of their patents. 
GE increased their patenting towards the end and after the program, with little to no statistically 
significant increase in their citation counts. For SWPC, there were a few years during the 
program when the patents they produced had higher citations, but the patent quantity only 
increased relative to domestic patenting activity. 
 Additionally, this paper sheds light on the efficiency gains by NGCC generators by 
tracing the technological developments through patent research. The efficiency gains had 
important consequences when at the turn of the twenty first century their popularity exploded in 
what has been called the natural gas capacity buildout, the largest three-year period of capacity 
growth in US history (Figure 1) (Joskow, 2006). 
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Figure 1: (left) Percentiles for NGCC plant efficiency based on a sample of NGCC plants in the 
US weighted by capacity. The chart is created using calculated plant efficiency using reported 
annual heat rates in EPA’s eGRID for the years 2005, 2007, 2009, and 2012, and organized by 
the year the plant came online. It is important to note that there were a different number of plants 
and observations by year online, which is represented as the count of observations in the right 
graph.9  
 
 The paper proceeds with an overview of the existing literature on the DOE-ATS program, 
as well as a brief history on NGCC development and use. Section 3 describes the nature of patent 
research as an indicator of innovative success, and the hypotheses I develop to measure program 
success using the patent data. In Section 4 I describe the patent data and econometric method I 
use before presenting the results in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes the findings and directions 
for future research.  
2. The DOE-ATS Program 
2.1 The Motivation for DOE-ATS 
2.1.1 Policy Changes 
 In the past, government has played an important role in promotion of new technologies 
through the innovation, adoption and commercialization stages to address common market 
                                                          
9 The spike in the 75 percentile efficiency for plants built in 2007 and 2011 were verified: the 2007 spike is from the 
Lake Side Power Plant in Utah, a Siemens Westinghouse design NGCC boasting 57% efficiency, while the 2011 
spike is from the Kleen Energy Center NGCC with Siemens STG6-5000F combustion turbines, cited for reaching 
over 57% efficiency. These observations stand out primarily because there are fewer NGCC plants that came online 
after the natural gas buildout from 2000-2004. 
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9 
failures. One approach is to stimulate or provide research and development funding through 
various means to overcome barriers to investment such as environmental externalities, market 
uncertainty, or free-riding on public benefit of knowledge creation (Popp, 2010). The 1992 
Energy Policy Act (EPACT) authorized the DOE-ATS program as a collaborative, cost-sharing 
program with industry to stimulate US turbine manufacturing business, and to overcome market 
failures for the development of more efficient natural gas-fired generators.  
Initially, gas turbines for electricity supply were developed as peaking units— to provide 
energy only when demand was at its highest— and were therefore small and infrequently used. 
While these systems could be made rather quickly and cheaply as compared to coal and nuclear 
power plants constructed in the 1950s-1970s, they were not very reliable or efficient, in part 
because they were only used for short periods of time (Hirsch, 1999). The introduction of 
opportunities for competition in electric generation through the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 changed that. Under PURPA, independent power producers 
(IPPs, or non-utilities) could now challenge the utility monopolies to provide power with what 
the Act designated as “qualifying facilities” (Hirsch, 1999). Specific types of efficient, small 
fossil-fuel generators or renewable power plants that met the definition of a qualifying facility 
were exempt from a selection of rules to which utilities were subject. This led to the 
development of the NGCC system, which exploits the waste heat from a gas turbine by using a 
heat recovery steam turbine for increased efficiency and power output. IPPs invested more 
heavily in these quickly built, low-cost natural-gas fired generators than did utilities, which 
benefitted from economies of scale in producing large coal and nuclear power plants for baseload 
power (Hirsch, 1999). 
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  The 1990-91 Gulf War prompted Congress and the President to develop a series of 
energy policy initiatives seeking energy independence and promotion of domestic fuels. In 
October of 1992, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act (EPACT), refocusing attention to 
energy conservation and efficiency and enhancing what PURPA had set out to do. EPACT and 
several Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) orders opened transmission lines to 
competing generators, in accordance with President George H. W. Bush’s preferred, market-
based approach to energy regulation. Despite PURPA, many vertically integrated utilities still 
had a monopoly over power generation within their region. EPACT permitted exempted 
wholesale generators to operate and sell electricity into the grid without restriction, while 
FERC’s orders included new requirements to make transmission information and access more 
available (Joskow, 2006). This new set of rules further encouraging competition meant utilities 
were subject to new incentives and optimization decisions as compared to their days of operating 
with little to no competition.  
 In addition to these federal energy policy changes, multiple states were choosing to go 
even further to encourage competition by adopting wholesale electricity deregulation. This 
involved a multi-year process of writing rules for restructuring and setting up electricity markets, 
which created uncertainty in the timing and effectiveness of the markets being designed (Craig & 
Savage, 2012). This had the overall effect of suppressing new capacity growth for several years 
as deregulation played out,10 making electric equipment manufacturers more hesitant to invest in 
innovations for new technologies. Sanyal and Ghosh (2013) evaluate the impact of deregulation 
                                                          
10 The Annual Energy Outlook report for 1995 from the Energy Information Administration is available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/archive.cfm. 
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on innovative activity by these upstream electric equipment manufacturers.11 They find there was 
a significant drop in innovative activity, measured in patent counts, by the upstream electric 
equipment manufacturers following EPACT despite a boom in innovation for other technologies 
in different fields at that time. Additionally, they find that the quality of the innovations suffered 
as well from the introduction of downstream competition, supporting DOE’s concerns about the 
impact of deregulation on R&D by manufacturers.  
Moreover, natural gas prices were low following deregulation of the natural gas industry in 
the 1980s (Figure 2). While low prices made natural gas-fired generators more economically 
attractive to buyers, it also reduced incentives for R&D for efficiency improvements. 
Government12 and industry believed natural gas prices would remain low for years, rendering 
natural gas-fired generators the technology choice for new capacity once investment resumed 
(Joskow, 2013; Curtis, 2003). However, natural gas prices began to rise as demand caught up 
with supply, requiring production from more expensive sources, imports from Canada, and 
additional pipeline infrastructure from 2000-2008. Natural gas prices dropped again with 
hydraulic fracturing and increased supply of unconventional natural gas in the US by 2009 
(Joskow, 2013). 
                                                          
11 They evaluated manufacturers of boilers, flue gas desulfurization units, and low nitrogen oxide control burners. 
Some of these manufacturers, such as General Electric, also manufactured gas turbines, but the technology selection 
is different than the one in this study. 
12 The Annual Energy Outlooks for years 1992-1996, available at: http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/archive.cfm. 
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Figure 2: US natural gas wellhead price in dollars per thousand cubic feet, in 2010 dollars, using 
data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA).  
2.1.2 Gas Turbine Manufacturing  
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health of the US gas turbine manufacturers staying competitive in the US and international 
markets (Curtis, 2003).   
 The government also expected high demand for new natural gas capacity once regulatory 
uncertainty surrounding deregulation wore off. Energy demand had been steadily increasing, and 
the government wanted US manufacturers to be poised to provide more efficient generators once 
power producers resumed investing in capacity (Curtis, 2003). Following EPACT, DOE 
expected a rise of IPPs, who favored natural gas generators, and an emphasis on efficiency by 
utilities and non-utilities as competition reshaped industry dynamics. As noted earlier, this 
projection came true as new natural gas capacity soared from 2000-2004, with 70% of this new 
capacity in the form of NGCC generators.13 
2.2 DOE-ATS 
For the reasons discussed above, EPACT authorized the creation of the DOE-ATS program 
as a cost-sharing partnership with industry to improve performance of gas turbines beyond 
existing technological limits. The program specifically aimed to achieve: (1) an efficiency of 
60% on a lower heating value basis in combined-cycle models, (2) NOx emissions of less than 
10 ppm without end-of-pipe controls, (3) a 10% lower cost of electricity, and (4) state-of-the-art 
reliability, availability, and maintainability levels. These would be significant improvements 
over the 50-53% efficiency and 40-50 ppm NOx emissions for NGCCs then operating (Curtis, 
2002). These technological developments would be socially beneficial by decreasing emissions 
and resource use, which aligned with EPACT’s overall aim for energy security and 
environmental benefits. 
 Congress supported the program with appropriations totaling $315 million, while 
industry provided approximately $155 million in the composite (National Research Council, 
                                                          
13 See Chapter 3 of this dissertation on the natural gas capacity boom. 
   
 
14 
2001). The goal of this program was to develop utility- and industrial-scale gas turbines that 
were reliable and available to the market by the year 2000. The focus on the programs was to 
promote research and development of advanced gas turbine systems, stimulate and develop 
knowledge networks between industry and the public sector, and create an industry-led program. 
The ATS project included collaboration among universities, industry, and government 
laboratories.14 All aspects of the project were competitively bid; however, General Electric (GE) 
and Westinghouse prevailed as the two companies to develop improved gas turbine systems from 
the DOE-ATS program through the final phase of the program, and were the only two companies 
with patents resulting directly from the program (Curtis, 2003). In 1998 Westinghouse divested 
its Power Generation business to Siemens, and the company became the Siemens Westinghouse 
Power Corporation (SWPC) until renaming the company Siemens in 2002. In the acquisition, 
Siemens inherited Westinghouse’s NGCC designs and the advanced technology that was 
developed during the DOE-ATS program (Curtis, 2003). However, new contract clauses with the 
US government required SWPC to use these intellectual property rights to manufacture US 
goods (Curtis, 2003). 
 Each of these companies took different approaches during the innovative process with 
DOE-ATS. GE primarily relied on its own internal capabilities and knowledge from 
organizations within GE’s company and mostly benefitted from the additional research funds 
provided by DOE-ATS. GE benefitted from the breadth and depth within its own company, 
which included GE Aircraft Engines, for research and development on gas turbines. 
                                                          
14 There is a long history of changes in R&D work supported by the government. Most pertinent in this study is the 
Technology Transfer Act of 1986 which established Cooperative Research and Development Agreements 
(CRADAS) for collaborative work between government laboratories and private industry. The terms of a CRADA 
allow the federal laboratory to assign private companies the rights to intellectual property resulting from joint work, 
while the federal government retains nonexclusive license to the intellectual property. For DOE-ATS, 93% of the 
patents directly resulting from the program were assigned to the private industry (Curtis, 2003). See Popp, 2006 for 
a longer discussion of changes in government R&D policy. 
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Additionally, GE had already begun work on advanced NGCC for international markets, which 
they believed would have more immediate demand (Curtis, 2003). By contrast, Westinghouse 
exited the aircraft engine industry in the 1960s, and relied on alliances and licensing agreements 
to acquire core capabilities for gas turbine technology. As a result, SWPC depended more 
heavily on universities, national laboratories and other government testing facilities for their 
innovative process with DOE-ATS (Curtis, 2003). According to Curtis (2003), the DOE-ATS 
program resulted in 55 new patents for the technology between 1995 and 2001, not including 
patents of spin-off technologies that may also contribute to increases in overall feasibility of new 
natural gas combustion units. These patents were identified through interviews and meetings 
with industry and government personnel involved with DOE-ATS. Curtis (2003) evaluates the 
citations by the DOE-ATS patents for evidence of collaboration, finding 14% of all citations in 
SWPC patents were self-citations to other SWPC15 patents, while 71% of all GE’s citations were 
self-citations, reflecting that GE relied more on its internal resources. 
Innovations for NGCC generators take place in the system as a whole, subsystems (e.g. the 
gas turbine or steam turbine), or components of the subsystems (e.g. blades of a gas turbine). The 
result of the DOE-ATS program were improvements in four subsystems of the combined cycle 
unit, including closed-loop steam cooling, single crystal superalloy castings, thermal barrier 
coatings, and lean pre-mix dry low NOx combustors. Through interviews with members 
involved in the DOE-ATS program, Curtis (2003) reports that the closed-loop steam cooling was 
the most critically important development for reaching the goals of the program, as confirmed by 
his patent analysis showing 56% of GE and 43% of SWPC DOE-ATS patents were associated 
with the closed-loop cooling subfield. 
                                                          
15 Or Siemens or Westinghouse Patents before Siemens bought Westinghouse Power Corporation. 
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GE’s first fully-integrated advanced NGCC unit was annonced in 1995, with the 7H frame at 
60-hz for the domestic market, and 9H 50-hz deign for international markets (Table 1). The 
480MW 9H frame was first installed in 2002 in South Wales, and the first US advanced system 
(7H) was installed in Scriba, NY in 2003.16 SWPC tested a fully integrated system using the 
DOE-ATS developed models in a demonstration in 2004.17 The fully integrated advanced NGCC 
line appeared in Siemens’ H-series generators (SGT6-8000H), which was first annonced in 2007 
and operational in 2013.18 While fully integrated systems were later to arrive in the US market, 
the subsystem innovations were introduced in earlier, “conventional” NGCC systems by these 
companies. SWPC incorporated advanced technologies in their existing products (W501 D, F 
and G turbines) during and shortly after the DOE-ATS program. DOE reports that over 165 gas 
turbines in North America in the early 2000s employed the improved components from the 
DOE-ATS program in SWPC generators.19 From 1999-2002, during the early portion of the 
natural gas capacity boom, GE’s global market share increased to 54%, and Siemens/Siemens 
Westinghouse Power Corporation to 22% (Bergek et al., 2008). 
                                                          
16 Article in Modern Power Systems on the first installation of GE’s 7H frame in the US: 
http://www.modernpowersystems.com/features/featurefirst-7h-turbines-go-to-heritage-station-scriba/ 
17 Technical progress report prepared for DOE by SWPC in 2004: https://www.osti.gov/scitech/servlets/purl/828617 
18 Article in Power Engineering on NGCC projects in North America: http://www.power-
eng.com/articles/2014/02/a-report-on-combined-cycle-projects-in-north-america.html 
19 Brief post from DOE on DOE-ATS success: https://www.energy.gov/fe/doe-technology-successes-breakthrough-
gas-turbines 
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Table 1: NGCC designs by released by the companies involved with DOE-ATS, adapted from 
Watson, 1997 and Bergek et al., 2008. 
               General Electric Siemens Westinghouse 
Year 
Announced Model 
Size 
(MW) 
Efficiency 
(%) 
First 
Order Model 
Size 
(MW) 
Efficiency 
(%) 
First 
Order Model 
Size 
(MW) 
Efficienc
y (%) 
First 
Order 
1987 7F 230 53 1987 
1989 501F 230 54 1989 
1990 V94.3 300 54 1992 
1994 501G 345 58 1997 
1995 7G 350 58 none V84.3A 245 58 1995 
1995 7H/9H 400/480 60 
2004/ 
1998 
1998 Adopts Westinghouse's 501F and 501G, now the F and G-Series 
2007 H-Series20 400 60.75% 2010 
2014 
7HA/ 
9HA21 346/446 63% 2014 
 
Today, fully integrated advanced NGCC make up less than 9% of the NGCC fleet in the US. 
The newer, conventional units with advanced NGCC technologies make up over 70% of the 
current fleet, with older, less efficient NGCC units about 21% of the fleet.22 Recent capital cost 
estimates from EIA price advanced and conventional NGCC units as significantly less expensive 
than coal-fired plants in terms of overnight capital costs and operations and maintentance 
(O&M) costs, with advanced NGCC plants having slightly higher overnight capital costs but 
lower O&M costs compared to conventional NGCC. 23 Advanced NGCC comes out slightly 
                                                          
20 Siemens product information: https://www.energy.siemens.com/hq/pool/hq/power-generation/gas-turbines/SGT5-
8000H/gasturbine-sgt5-8000h-h-klasse-performance.pdf. Article on Siemens plant performance: 
http://www.elp.com/articles/2010/06/fpl-picks-siemens-gas-turbine-for-two-plant-modernization-projects.html. 
21 Articles on GE plant performance: https://powergen.gepower.com/content/dam/gepower-
pgdp/global/en_US/images/product/gas%20turbines/ha-timeline.jpg, and http://www.genewsroom.com/Press-
Releases/Exelon-Orders-GE-H-Class-Gas-Turbines-World-Largest-Most-Efficient-for-US-Combined-Cycle-Power-
Projects. 
22 ICF International report submitted to the Gas Turbine Association (March 29, 2013): 
http://www.gasturbine.org/docs/newdocs/YAGTP4602_GTA%20White%20Paper_041013%20final.pdf. 
23 EIA Updated Capital Cost Estimates for Utility Scale Electricity Generating Plants (November 22, 2016): 
http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/powerplants/capitalcost/. 
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ahead of conventional NGCC plants in levelized costs, giving them the lowest levelized cost of 
all generation technologies absent tax credits.24 
3. Patent Research 
 In order to evaluate the claims by DOE that the program was successful outside of direct 
outputs measured in commercialized technology, I conduct a study using patent data. Patents 
have long been used as an indicator of innovation in empirical studies in place of, or as a 
complement to, aggregated R&D values. A patent places a temporary monopoly on an invention 
for the inventor as a means of encouraging innovation and technological progress (Griliches, 
1990). It has been established that patent applications are an appropriate measure for R&D since 
they are usually filed early in the research process, thereby making patent data sorted by 
application date a useful indicator of R&D activity to measure innovative activity (Griliches, 
1990). 
 The main advantage of using patent data over R&D expenditures is that patents contain 
disaggregated information about innovative activity. Patents include bibliographic information 
about the inventors and applicants, descriptive data on the patent coverage, technology 
classification data, as well as information about knowledge flows through evaluation of patent 
citations. Despite their usefulness, patents are an imperfect measure of innovative activity. Not 
all inventions may be patentable, and the propensity to patent and can vary across industries 
(Popp, 2005). In this case, I evaluate patents for the advanced turbine class primarily by gas 
turbine manufacturers; therefore, the differences in propensity to patent are less of a concern. A 
study by Bergek et al. (2008) on NGCC industry shakeouts determine patents are a relevant 
                                                          
24 “EIA Levelized Cost and Levelized Avoided Cost of New Generation Resources” in the Annual Energy Outlook 
2017 (April 2017), available at https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/pdf/electricity_generation.pdf. 
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indicator to measure of R&D for NGCC technologies since they fall in the broader category of 
electrical equipment, with some of the highest propensities to patent. 
3.1 Patent Counts 
  I use patent counts of unique inventions as an indicator of the quantity of innovative 
activity taking place for ATS technologies. Previous studies on environmental technologies find 
1-3 year lags between the initiation of a program or policy and associated patenting response 
(Sanyal & Ghosh, 2013; Johnstone et al., 2010). Since the DOE-ATS report states there was a 
concern there would be a lack of this type of research in the 1990s, justifying government 
intervention, I expect to see low patent counts prior to or in the early years of the program. 
During the program or shortly after, I expect to see higher numbers of patents from the 
participants relative to non-participants in this field. This would indicate that innovative activity 
was higher for the participants, possibly as a result of DOE-ATS. 
3.2 Patent Citations 
 Another common concern with patent data is that each patent may not hold the same 
value, therefore additional consideration must be taken to determine the relative contribution of 
each patent (Griliches, 1990). Frequently, researchers turn to the information contained in the 
patent citations to evaluate knowledge flows and approximate the impact of the patent. Patent 
citations credit previously existing knowledge that the new work builds upon, and delimit the 
scope of the patent’s claim. Evaluating citations contained within a patent (backwards citations) 
provides information about knowledge flows associated with the invention, while citations to the 
patent (forward citations) contain information on how useful the innovation was for producing 
additional knowledge (Trajtenberg et al., 1997).  
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 Like the issues discussed with patent counts, each citation may not provide equal 
information about knowledge flows. Citations can be identified by the applicant, patent 
examiner, or lawyer of the innovator or applicant, and sometimes for strategic reasons. Further 
complicating matters, legal requirements and practices for identifying prior work can vary across 
different patent offices, and the United States Patenting and Trademark Office (USPTO) is the 
only patent office where the inventor has a legal duty to declare and cite any previous knowledge 
on which the innovation was built (Verdolini & Gaelotti, 2011). However, studies on citations to 
and from USPTO patents have determined a significant portion of the citations represent an 
important knowledge flow (Jaffe et al., 2000), and USPTO citations have been used to measure 
knowledge diffusion (Verdolini & Gaelotti, 2011) and patent importance (Popp, 2017). For these 
reasons, I use only the USPTO citation data for the citation analysis to determine the relative 
impact of the patents produced during the DOE-ATS program.  
 A survey of the patent citation literature by Jaffe and de Rassenfosse (2017) reports 
numerous studies confirming a relationship between citation counts and technological 
importance and economic value (defined in various but specific ways). Trajtenberg et al. (1997) 
find that university patents are associated with more basic research compared to corporate 
patents, and therefore hold a higher importance to future research measured through higher 
forward citation counts. To be regarded as basic means the innovation answered fundamental 
scientific questions, rather than focusing on specific technical issues associated with more 
applied research. Industry is more likely to work on applied innovations that solve problems with 
their specific technologies in efforts to commercialize them, while basic research will have a 
major impact on the field and be more fundamental to later work, and thus will have more 
citations (Trajtenberg et al., 1997). Curtis (2003) describes the innovative work in DOE-ATS as 
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“breakthrough” and “transformational,” but “generic” in a sense that the innovations add to 
technological understanding applicable to all turbine manufacturers. While the patents I evaluate 
in this study are from private industry, I hypothesize that the patents filed by the DOE-ATS 
program participants during or shortly after the program will have higher technological 
importance and therefore higher citation counts relative to earlier patents by the participants and 
patenting by non-participants.  
4. Data & Method 
4.1 Data 
 I use the Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT) maintained and distributed 
by the European Patent Office (EPO). PATSTAT is a comprehensive source of bibliographic 
patent data for over 100 patent offices, including the USPTO, and is a commonly used database 
for patent research (e.g. Lanzi et al., 2011; de Rassenfosse et al., 2013).  
 I begin by identifying patents representing unique inventions in advanced turbine 
technology beyond the 55 patents provided by Curtis (2002). This way, I can evaluate advanced 
turbine patenting activity taking place outside of the program, as well as before and after the 
program to evaluate the impact of the program on advanced turbine innovation. Additionally, 
Curtis (2003) states there were spin-off innovations that related to the research done in DOE-
ATS but which were not a “direct” result of DOE-ATS and therefore not discussed in his 
research. I develop a search strategy similar to the one used by Lanzi et al. (2011) to identify the 
relevant International Patent Classification (IPC) codes, developed by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization and used to classify inventions. I identify common IPC codes in the DOE-
ATS patents in each of the advanced turbine technology subfields, and verified that the code 
applies to NGCC technologies related to the advanced turbine subfield using the IPC definitions 
(Appendix A). I was able to verify some of these codes with previous literature on efficiency 
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improving innovations in fossil-fuel technologies (Lanzi et al., 2011). The search using the 
chosen IPC codes identifies 43 of the 55 DOE-ATS patents.25 
 Inventors often seek patent protection in multiple countries, in which case a priority 
patent (first application filing) is duplicated and submitted for protection under another patenting 
authority. The application date of the priority filing is the priority date and assigned to the 
duplicate patents, which all fall in the same patent family. Patents that do not have any duplicates 
are referred to as solo patents (i.e. family size of 1). In order to count unique inventions only, I 
sort the patents by their families and keep the earliest patent (i.e. priority patent) based on the 
application date. I use the priority year of the patent as its date, since that marks when patenting 
protection begins if the patent is granted, and corresponds with the timing of the inventive 
activity (Griliches, 1990). I begin with over twenty-five thousand granted patents with a priority 
date between 1980-2008, which reduces to approximately fourteen thousand unique inventions 
(i.e. families). 26 I provide the descriptive statistics on the families in Table 2. To evaluate 
patenting activity occurring in the US only, I keep the patent from each family that was granted 
by the USPTO in a second dataset (approximately eight thousand unique inventions, as some 
families never sought protection in the US).  
 In order to assign patents to the appropriate companies, I use the applicant’s “person 
data” provided in PATSTAT.27 I identify 23 companies that appear most frequently in the 
extracted patent data. I merged together several companies based on an evaluation of the patent 
families and research on the companies to identify company mergers and subsidiaries, which 
results in 14 companies (Appendix B). In some cases, the innovations targeted at jet engines had 
                                                          
25 I excluded the thermal barrier coating technology subfield because the applications are broader and there are 
fewer common IPC codes among these patents.  
26 I choose to work with granted patent applications rather than all applications because the USPTO only began 
publishing information in 2001 on applications that were not granted (de Rassenfosse et al., 2013). 
27 This is akin to the USPTO’s “assignee” data. 
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applications for NGCC turbines as well; therefore, there are some companies that focus on jet 
engines included in my dataset. Patents by companies that appeared infrequently in my dataset 
are placed in the group “Other.” The descriptive statistics for these companies are provided for 
their patents granted anywhere in the world (Global) and just the US. Figure 3 is a plot of patent 
counts by the global and US datasets. 
 For the reasons discussed in Section 3, I sum forward citations for USPTO patents to 
other USPTO patents for the citation analysis. I remove self-citations, whereby a company cites 
its own patent, in order to focus on the external spillover benefit of a patent to determine its 
value (Jaffe et al., 1993). Otherwise, it is possible a patent may have higher citation counts due to 
the stock of patents that followed by that company. The citation statistics, based on individual 
patents, are reported in Table 2, and Figure 4 shows patent citation counts by the priority year. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the patent count and citation data for the global and US 
datasets. 
 
Global US 
Group N Mean 
St. 
Dev. Min Max 
% 
Self  N Mean 
St. 
Dev. Min Max 
% 
Self  
Counts 
    Aero28 29 59.4 39.4 23 159 29 36.3 21.8 16 109 
    Alstom 29 25.4 18.5 2 57 29 16 12.7 1 44 
    GE 29 80.5 59.6 10 198 29 66.6 50 8 185 
    Japanese29 29 43.7 24.5 4 84 29 10.5 4 4 23 
    Mitsubishi 29 32.1 29.7 0 119 29 8.1 11.6 0 43 
    Other 29 178 69.6 101 367 29 84.4 32.6 49 187 
    SWPC 29 30.3 18.7 8 70 29 20 11.7 4 43 
    United Tech. 29 41.4 25.1 10 114 29 34.4 17.2 9 92 
    All 232 61.4 61.6 0 367 232 34.5 35.4 0 187 
Citations 
    Aero       1,048 11.3 12.2 0 132 7% 
    Alstom       461 9.7 10.2 0 94 8% 
    GE       1,914 13.3 14.1 0 117 25% 
    Japanese       302 15.4 17.1 0 119 8% 
    Mitsubishi       232 9.6 9 0 50 9% 
    Other       2,424 13.6 19.9 0 494 3% 
    SWPC       574 11.8 14 0 95 9% 
    United Tech.       988 14.6 16.1 0 158 15% 
    All       7,943 12.9 16 0 494 12% 
  
                                                          
28 For the purpose of the descriptive statistics only, the Aero group represents four aerospace manufacturing 
companies with smaller contributions to the dataset: Honeywell, MTU, Rolls-Royce, and SNECMA. 
29 For the purpose of the descriptive statistics only, the Japanese group represents four Japanese gas turbine 
manufacturing companies: Hitachi, IHI Corp., Kawasaki Heavy Industries, and Toshiba. 
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Figure 3: Patent counts (inventions) for the global and US datasets. SWPC is the combination of 
Siemens and Westinghouse patents before they merged (1998). 
 
 
Figure 4: Citation counts per patent by each company by priority year. SWPC is the combination 
of Siemens and Westinghouse patents before they merged (1998). 
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4.2 Model 
 I use a fixed-effects model, where the coefficients of interest are the interaction of a 
participant dummy (assigned to GE and SWPC) with individual year dummies ( ∙ ∙
) from 1988-2008 to evaluate the difference in participant patenting compared to 
non-participants in each year before, during, and after the DOE-ATS program. This way, I am 
implicitly imposing no effect from 1980-1987. Since the program is eight years long, I am 
interested in seeing how patenting responds to the program in each year of the program. There is 
a possible lag in the timing between initiation of a program and patenting that can vary among 
policies (Sanyal & Ghosh, 2013). While the 55 DOE-ATS patents were issued from 1995-2001, 
the DOE report on the program does not state the time period it may have taken for spin-off 
technologies associated with DOE-ATS work to be patented. Moreover, previous studies have 
found that policy impacts on patenting counts for environmental technologies have diminishing 
returns (Popp, 2005), which will be easier to evaluate with this approach. The trade-off of 
evaluating each year to determine a temporal signature is that I lose degrees of freedom and, 
potentially, the significance of the coefficients. 
  Since I am using count data as my dependent variables with overdispersion (mean < 
variance), I use a negative binomial model. A negative binomial model uses a Poisson process, 
which is flexible in the error structure compared to ordinary least squares estimation which 
assumes a conditional normal error structure. The Poisson process allows transformation of the 
predicted outcome, letting nonlinear relationships be linearized between the dependent variable 
and predictors. A negative binomial is more appropriate than a Poisson model in this case 
because it also accounts for overdispersion by way of an additional error parameter (Coxe et al., 
2009; Allison, 2009). However, the fixed-effect in a conditional negative binomial regression 
applies to the distribution of the dispersion parameter rather than controlling for time-invariant 
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parameters (Allison, 2009). Therefore, I use the unconditional maximum likelihood negative 
binomial model with dummy variables for the individual fixed-effects and clustered robust 
standard errors by company, which Allison (2009) recommends as an appropriate alternative to 
the fixed-effects conditional negative binomial model (equation 1). In a second model, I use the 
same specification but separate interactions for each company that participated in the program to 
determine if the program affected the participants differently (equation 2). The participants in 
this case are GE, Westinghouse (from before the acquisition), and SWPC (Siemens alone before 
the acquisition, SWPC after the acquisition).30 
 
=  + ∙ +  + +           (eq. 1) 
 
=  + ( ∙ ) + + +           (eq. 2) 
 
 
=    
=  ( ) 
=   
 (0, − ; 1, ) 
=  −  
=  −  
=  
 
 For patent citations, I use the same structure as the patent count models, but my unit of 
analysis in this case is each patent. The dependent variable is the number of citations (excluding 
self-citations) the patent received. The year fixed-effects controls for the amount of time each 
patent has to be cited, as well as the number of patents afterwards (i.e. opportunities for a 
                                                          
30 In the participant models (eq. 1 and 3), SWPC represents all patents from Siemens, Westinghouse, and SWPC as 
one company. 
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citation).31 This model also has company fixed-effects and clustered robust standard errors at the 
company level. 
=  + ∙ +  + +           (eq. 3) 
 
=  + ( ∙ ) + + +           (eq. 4) 
 
=  
 I run these regressions on patent counts and citations for all unique patents authorized 
across the world, versus those authorized only in the US.32 Since the program was designed to 
stimulate innovation in the US, the dataset for patents authorized in the US only represents the 
patents that sought US protection. The global dataset, however, represents all innovative activity 
in the ATS field, including activity by foreign companies that may not seek US patent 
protection.33  
5. Results 
 The model coefficients and confidence intervals displayed in the figures in this section 
(and Tables in Appendix C) have been transformed to incidence-rate ratios (IRR), which is the 
exponentiated version of the negative binomial coefficient ( ). The IRR is interpreted as the 
predicted multiplicative effect on the incidence rate, which for patent counts is how many unique 
inventions were patented in a year by the company. For example, in subgraph A of Figure 5, the 
coefficient for the year 1990 interaction for participants in the US data set is 2.75. This means 
that participants patented 2.75 times more than non-participants in that year. Using IRR, a 
coefficient of 1 (rather than 0), indicates no effect. For citations, the IRR represents the 
                                                          
31 Additionally, year fixed-effects control for universal parameters for each year that may affect firm’s investment 
behavior, such as anticipation of low natural gas prices or decreases in coal R&D which may also increase NGCC 
innovation. 
32 In addition, I could evaluate the non-US patents to determine if there were universal impacts to all patents outside 
of the US. 
33 However, the global dataset does not include country fixed-effects that would control for natural gas R&D 
programs outside the US that took place during this time. I do not include country fixed-effects because I do not 
have many companies from the same country. 
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multiplicative effect on how many citations the average patent for the participants (or each 
company) received. I first discuss the results of the count and citation analyses in detail 
separately, then summarize with a discussion of what the collective results signify in section 5.3. 
Full tables of the results are in Appendix C. 
5.1 Count Results 
 
  
  
 
Figure 5: The coefficient results from the models with 95% confidence intervals, represented as 
incidence-rate ratios, with the years of the program outlined in red. Top figure (A) is the joint 
treatment effect for the program participants, while the bottom figures (C & D) represent 
coefficients for participant companies separately. In the top figures, the coefficients are from the 
global and US authorized datasets. Subgraph A displays the treatment effect, while subgraph B 
contains the year fixed-effects coefficients. On the bottom, subgraph C is the treatment 
coefficients for the global dataset, while subgraph D is for the US authorized dataset. 
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 After removing a linear trend in turbine patenting for the global and US datasets 
(subgraph B), there are no significant treatment effects in the global dataset (subgraph A) at the 
95% confidence level, however subgraph C shows more statistically significant treatment effects 
when each company is separately represented in the global dataset. GE experienced higher 
patenting activity relative to non-participants in 1990 and 1991 before the program began in the 
global dataset, while Westinghouse had higher patenting activity during this time only relative to 
US patenting (subgraph D). Patenting by both companies tapers off in the early years of the 
program and are mostly statistically insignificant, except for 1994 in the US dataset only. GE 
was more of a global company than Westinghouse (Bergek et al., 2008), therefore the fact that 
Westinghouse pre-program increase in patenting does not show up in the global data is not all 
that surprising. Prior to 1998, the SWPC coefficient in the individual company subgraphs (C & 
D) represents patenting activity by Siemens before the acquisition of Westinghouse, which is not 
statistically significant in the global or US dataset until after the acqusition of Westinghouse. For 
the US dataset, this is expected, as Siemens did not seek US patent protection as frequently as 
they did after the acquisition of Westinghouse. 
 Towards the later years of the program (1998-2000) SWPC (Siemens + Westinghouse 
now) and GE both appear to begin to increase their patenting activity relative to the global 
dataset (subgraph C). However, the statistically significant coefficients for SWPC are more of a 
reflection of the low patenting activity by Siemens in the 1980s, pre-Westinghouse acquisition, 
which are the base years for the treatment coefficients. In subgraph A, the participants include 
GE and SWPC, and these coefficients are not statistically significant for the joint effect in the 
global dataset. In subgraph C, the statistically significant increase in patenting for SWPC is a 
reflection of the increased patenting from adding Westinghouse, since I separated Westinghouse 
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out before the acquisition to focus on the impact of DOE-ATS on the only two participants at 
that time – GE and Westinghouse.34 Therefore, SWPC patenting in the company subgraphs is 
relative to their patenting in the 1980s as just Siemens, and not a proper comparison to draw 
conclusions from for SWPC after the acquisition of Westinghouse. For example, the magnitude 
of the spike in SWPC patenting activity in 2006 in the US dataset (subgraph D) indicating they 
had 12 times more patents than non-participants is largely reflective of low patenting activity in 
the US by Siemens during the base years of 1980-1988. Based on subgraph A, the joint effect of 
the participants on the US patenting was statistically significant, confirming SWPC patenting 
was higher after the program in the US relative to Siemens+Westinghouse patenting in the 
1980s, just not 12 times higher (subgraph D).  
 For GE, the increasing patenting rates towards the end of the program to after the 
program peak at 2.87 times higher than non-participants in the global dataset, and 4.1 times as 
high in the US dataset in 2000. It is not surprising that GE, a US company, has a higher 
coefficient for the US dataset. Both companies continue to have high patenting activity following 
the program, but for GE to a lesser degree, and SWPC for the reasons mentioned above. GE’s 
peak in 2000 gradually decreases and levels out, which may be evidence of diminishing returns 
from the DOE-ATS program.  
 
                                                          
34 Appendix D contains model results without separating out Westinghouse from SWPC for verification. 
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5.2. Citation Results 
 
 
 
Figure 6: The coefficient results from the citation models with 95% confidence intervals, 
represented as incidence-rate ratios, and the years of the program outlined in red. Top figures (A 
& B) are from the models with the joint effect for the program participants, while the bottom 
figure (C) contains coefficients for participant companies run separately. The citation models 
were run on data from the US only. 
 
 In subgraph A of Figure 6, the participants (joint) 2004-2005 were the only two years 
with statistically significant higher citations than non-participants, on the order of 1.3-1.4 times 
the average non-participant citations received. The individual company treatment coefficients 
(subgraph C) show the post-program increase was shared between GE and SWPC. There is less 
of a concern comparing post-acquisition SWPC patents to pre-acquisition Siemens patents, since 
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the impact on citations may not be as severe as the impact on patent counts when a company size 
grows. SWPC had a couple other years post-program with higher citations, and higher citations 
in 1998 and 2000 after merging with Westinghouse. Westinghouse was the only company with 
higher citations during the program, from 1993-1997. The citation rate in 1993 was 2.47 times 
the citing rate of non-participants in that year. The Curtis (2003) report states that Westinghouse 
participated in more alliances and government collaborations during DOE-ATS, which may 
explain why their patents were cited more. These results are all after removing a year fixed-effect 
(subgraph B), which clearly shows growing truncation from 1999-2008 due to less opportunity 
for newer patents to receive citations. 
5.3 Combined Results 
 Overall, the program did not have a uniform impact on the participants. There were a few 
years when the joint coefficient for patent counts are statistically significant, but that only occurs 
relative to US patents only. Program participants increased their patenting relative to non-
participants patenting in the US several years after the conclusion of the program, from 2002-
2008. Since these coefficients are not significant in the global dataset, it indicates that foreign 
companies were also pursuing advanced turbine innovations during this period, and the DOE-
ATS participants were not doing more patenting relative to companies that were not pursuing US 
patent protection. However, it is unclear if the program was focused on participant’s activity 
relative to the US market only. If so, this could indicate the program was successful since it 
increased domestic patenting activity for the participants in the years following the program. 
 There are only two years in the joint citation analysis with statistically significant 
coefficients, 2004-2005, also several years after the conclusion of the DOE-ATS program, which 
is not expected since the DOE-ATS report concludes commercialized technologies were 
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demonstrated at the conclusion of the program, not several years afterwards (Curtis, 2003). More 
coefficients are significant in the analysis of each company separately for the counts and the 
citations. However, there are only a few recognizable patterns that may be associated with the 
DOE-ATS program for each company. First, it does appear GE and Westinghouse had higher 
patenting activity in the years right before the program, GE relative to the globe and 
Westinghouse relative to the US only. Additionally, Westinghouse’s patents in 1988 and 1989 
had higher patent citations. This does not fit the description of the program in the DOE-ATS 
report that “this type of research was not taking place at this time,” (Curtis, 2003) however it is 
unclear if “at this time” meant before the program or during the early years of the program.  
 In the early years of the program, Westinghouse had lower patenting activity compared to 
the global patenting, while GE’s patent counts were slightly higher than non-participants 
compared to US patenting only. Again, there is no clear effect in the early years of the program 
on patent counts. In terms of impact, Westinghouse did have higher impact patents (i.e. higher 
citations) from 1993-1997, but this was not true for GE, and more research would need to be 
conducted to conclude why.  
 Towards the end of the program (1998-2000), GE increased their patenting activity 
relative to the global dataset, and SWPC increased their patenting relative to the US dataset. This 
peaks for GE in 2000, while SWPC continued to grow relative to US patenting, which is 
probably more a reflection of Siemens acquisition of Westinghouse and the new, legal 
requirement for SWPC to manufacturer US goods with Westinghouse’s intellectual property 
developed during DOE-ATS that Siemens inherited. Citations were no higher for GE after the 
program, with the exception of a small increase from 2004-2005, while SWPC had several years 
with higher citations between 2000 and 2006. Overall, this analysis shows the program 
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contributed to increased patenting activity by GE towards the later years of the program, and it 
also contributed to higher impact patents by Westinghouse in the early years of the program. 
6. Conclusion 
 This study adds to the existing literature regarding the impact of a government-sponsored 
cost sharing program on advanced turbine innovations for NGCC generators in the US. The 
results of a patent analysis show few joint impacts on program participants in the years before, 
during, and after the program which ran from 1992-2000. The individual company analyses 
reveal a greater number of statistically significant effects for companies involved with the 
program, however there are few clear patterns indicative of the impact of the DOE-ATS 
program. There are several suggestive results which require more investigation, possibly of a 
qualitative nature, to confirm. 
 Patent quantity was higher in the participants, particularly GE, but also for Westinghouse 
relative to US patents only, in the years before the program. This would indicate that there was 
not a lack of this type of research in the years before the program by the program participants in 
the US. As the program started, patent counts actually decreased for the participants but citations 
increased in the early years for Westinghouse only. Johnstone et al. (2010) show firms will focus 
more on research that is closer to being commercially ready than on basic research (which can be 
more risky). Yet, the DOE-ATS research was described as transformational, with generic 
applications to all turbine manufacturers (Curtis, 2003). The lower patent count but higher 
citation rate for Westinghouse could indicate it was moving from more applied research 
pertaining to its specific technologies, to more basic research associated with DOE-ATS with a 
broader impact on the field.  
 Towards the later years of the program, the opposite occurred for GE: GE increased its 
patent counts from 1998-2000, but had lower citation counts than non-participants at this time. It 
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is possible that GE moved closer to commercialization towards the end of the program, resulting 
in higher patent counts with lower citations. SWPC increased its patenting activity in the US and 
global datasets after the acquisition of Westinghouse (1998), and had a few years during and 
after the program with higher citations. But, impact in the US is in part due to low patenting in 
the US before acquiring Westinghouse, which certainly changed once SWPC was legally 
required by new contract clauses with the US government to use the intellectual property rights 
from DOE-ATS to produce US goods. 
 Westinghouse and GE released new NGCC models in 1994 and 1995, respectively, 
which may explain the pre-program increase in patenting. But, under the same argument, they 
did not release their next NGCC models until 2007 (SWPC) and 2014 (GE), despite having 
increases in patenting from 1998-2000. This activity may be associated with incremental 
improvements to their mid-1990s models during this time, as they were each experiencing some 
problems with and modifying the DOE-ATS technologies (Bergek et al., 2008; Curtis, 2003). 
Additionally, in 2003 and 2004, the global and US year fixed-effects have a positive deviation 
from the linear trend; this may suggest that GE and SWPC were first to market, 4-6 years ahead 
of competitors as their patenting activity started increasing around 1998-1999. Accordingly, GE 
increased its global market share from 28% in 1987-1991, to 54% from 1999-2000. For Siemens, 
its market share increased from 19% in the early 1990s, to 22% after acquiring Westinghouse. 
Again, additional work will need to be done to confirm the hypotheses formed from the patent 
analysis, since no clear patterns associated with the program are found.35  
 Another area of future research on NGCC innovation should consider programs and 
developments related to NGCC ramp-speed, which has increased in advanced generators over 
                                                          
35 Future work with more specific data on installed NGCC models and license agreements would be useful for 
further evaluation on what patent applications led to installed technology. 
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time.36 The fast start-up and shut-down times for NGCC makes it a good complement to 
intermittent renewable sources of generation, such as wind and solar. Johnstone et al. (2010) find 
renewable policies have had a positive impact on renewable innovation, therefore it would be 
interesting to evaluate if renewable policies have also contributed to ramp-speed innovations for 
NGCC post-DOE-ATS. There are renewed calls for government involvement to invest in another 
round of advanced turbine innovations, as there is a concern Japanese manufacturers are further 
ahead of the US in developing even faster ramp-speed technologies.25 Lessons learned from the 
DOE-ATS program can be useful in developing future programs for NGCC technological 
change. 
  
                                                          
36 Report on Competitiveness of US Gas Turbine Manufacturers, prepared by ICF International for the Gas Turbine 
Association (March 29, 2013): 
http://www.gasturbine.org/docs/newdocs/YAGTP4602_GTA%20White%20Paper_041013%20final.pdf. 
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Appendix A: IPC Codes 
IPC Codes Definition 
Cycles:  
    F01K 21/04 Using mixtures of steam and gas; Plants generating or heating steam 
by bringing water or steam into direct contact with hot gas (direct-
contact steam generators in general  
    F01K 23/02,04,06,08,10* Plants characterized by more than one engine delivering power 
external to the plant, the engines being driven by different fluids, the 
engine cycles being thermally coupled 
    F02C 3/20, 22, 24, 26,28, 30, 32, 34, 36* Gas-turbine plants characterized by the use of combustion products 
as the working fluid, using a special fuel, oxidant, or dilution fluid to 
generate the combustion products 
    F02C 6/10,12* Plural gas-turbine plants; Combinations of gas-turbine plants with 
other apparatus,  
supplying working fluid to a user, e.g. a chemical process, which 
returns working fluid to a turbine of the plant 
    F02C6/ Combinations of gas-turbine plants with other apparatus 
    F02C6/02 Plural gas-turbine plants having a common power output 
  
Compressor  
    F01D 25/24 Casings (modified for heating or cooling) 
  
Combustor  
    F23R 3/28, 34,00 Generating combustion products of high pressure or high velocity, 
e.g. gas-turbine combustion chambers, continuous combustion 
chambers using liquid or gaseous fuel 
  
Closed loop steam cooling  
    F01D 25/24, 12 e.g. Steam Turbines, component parts, for cooling (casings or 
general) 
    F01D 5/18 Blades, hollow blades; heating or cooling means on blades 
    F01D 5/08 Blade carrying members for heating or cooling 
    F02C 7/08 Gas turbine plants, features, component parts, heating air supply 
before combustion 
    F02C 7/12, 16, 18 Gas turbine plants, component parts, cooling of plants 
  
Seals  
    F01D 5/02, 06 Steam engines, steam turbines, blades, members, rotors 
    F01D 11/00, 08 Minimalizing internal leakage of working fluid, for sealing space 
between rotor blade and stator 
  
Removable inner turbine shell  
    F01D 25/14 Steam turbines, component parts, casings modified 
  
Single Crystal  
    F01D 5/00 Non-positive-displacement machines and engines: blades 
*also in Lanzi et al.  
Note: I eliminated the thermal barrier coating subfield, as there are fewer common IPC codes in this subfield and the 
technical applications are fairly broad.  
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Appendix B: Company Information 
Company Company Focus Group Country Founded Pertinent Mergers  Note 
General Electric Turbine manufacturer Participant US 1892 Nuovo Pignone (Italy, 1994) GE bought Nuovo Pignone in 1994, now GE subsidiary.37 
Siemens/Siemens 
Westinghouse Power 
Corporation (SWPC) Turbine manufacturer Participant US 1847 
Westinghouse Power 
Corporation (1998) 
Siemens bought Westinghouse Power Corporation in 1998, temporarily 
renamed SWPC before going back to Siemens in 2004.38 
Alstom Turbine manufacturer France 1928 
Asea Brown Boveri (ABB) 
(2000) 
ABB formed from a merger between ASEA (Sweden) and BBC Brown 
Boveri Ltd. (Switzerland) in 1987. In 1999, ABB and Alstom merge their 
power generation business.39 
Combustion Engineering (US, 
1989) Bought by ABB in 1989.8 
Hitachi Turbine manufacturer Japanese Japan 191040 
Honeywell Aerospace Aero US 1885 AlliedSignal (US, 1999) 
AlliedSignal acquired Honeywell in 1999 but chose to retain Honeywell 
name for recognition.41 
IHI Corp. Turbine manufacturer Japanese Japan 185342 
Kawasaki Heavy Industries Turbine manufacturer Japanese Japan 1896 Kawasaki Gas Turbines entered the market in 1976.43 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Turbine manufacturer Japanese Japan 189144 
MTU Aerospace Aero Germany 1909 DaimlerBenz  Parent company45 
MAN Turbo-machinery  Parent company 
DaimlerChrysler (1998) Daimler-Benz merges with Chrysler to form DaimlerChrysler46 
Rolls-Royce Aerospace Aero UK 1906 
Allison Gas Turbine Division 
(US, 1994)47 
This segment of the business was acquired by Siemens in 2014, therefore I 
do not include this merger in my dataset.48 
SNECMA Aerospace Aero France 1945 
Acquired by Safran in 2005, which I do not include as a merger because I 
did not have many patents by Safran and the merger was late in my 
database.49 
Toshiba Turbine manufacturer Japanese Japan 1939   
United Technologies Aerospace US 1929 Pratt & Whitney (US) Subsidiary50 
                                                          
37 Reuters: Reuters: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ge-oilandgas-idUSBRE98I0J920130919 
38 Siemens Company history: Siemen's company history: https://www.siemens.com/history/en/news/1097_siemens-westinghouse.htm 
39 ABB company history: http://www02.abb.com/ 
40Hitachi company information: company information: http://www.hitachi-america.us/products/business/isd/generators/ 
41 Honeywell company history: https://www.honeywell.com/who-we-are/our-history 
42 IHI Corp. company history: https://www.ihi.co.jp/en/ 
43 Kawasaki company history: http://www.kawasakigasturbines.com/index.php/company_background/ 
44 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries company history: https://www.mhi.com/company/ 
45 MTU company history: http://www.mtu-report.com/History/MTU/What-does-the-T-in-MTU-stand-for. Acquired by Rolls-Royce in 2011, which I do not include because this 
was well after my dataset ends in 2008. Primarily focused on aerospace and automotive, but manufactured in gas turbine and compressors for power generation as well. 
46 Daimler company history: https://www.daimler.com/company/tradition/company-history/1995-2007.html 
47 GM history: https://history.gmheritagecenter.com/wiki/index.php/Allison_Engineering-Allison_Transmission 
48 Rolls-Royce company history: company history: https://www.rolls-royce.com/about/our-story/rolls-royce-history-timeline.aspx 
49Safran company history: https://www.safran-aircraft-engines.com/. Full name: Société nationale d'études et de construction de moteurs d'aviation 
50 Pratt & Whitney and United Technologies company history: http://www.utc.com/Who-We-Are/Pages/At-A-Glance.aspx#pratt-whitney; Bergek et al. (2008) states Pratt & 
Whitney and Siemens worked together in the 1990s, but they did not share any patents in my database. 
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Appendix C: Full Model Results 
Table C1. Results from Global and US count regressions for participants. 
 
Global US 
  Coeff. St. Dev. Coeff. St. Dev. 
Treatment Effect 
    1988 1.044 (0.173) 1.787*** (0.263) 
    1989 1.154 (0.313) 1.970** (0.512) 
    1990 1.418 (0.585) 2.751*** (0.677) 
    1991 1.353 (0.636) 2.962** (1.011) 
    1992 0.986 (0.480) 2.412* (0.873) 
    1993 0.694 (0.329) 1.377 (0.505) 
    1994 0.607 (0.215) 1.542* (0.276) 
    1995 0.654 (0.302) 1.621 (0.574) 
    1996 0.734 (0.239) 1.194 (0.336) 
    1997 0.895 (0.388) 1.353 (0.694) 
    1998 1.168 (0.412) 1.607 (0.655) 
    1999 1.248 (0.776) 1.854 (1.243) 
    2000 1.655 (0.892) 2.336 (1.415) 
    2001 1.331 (0.672) 2.264 (1.226) 
    2002 1.578 (0.632) 2.685** (0.957) 
    2003 1.185 (0.354) 1.935* (0.510) 
    2004 1.32 (0.340) 1.939** (0.431) 
    2005 1.28 (0.399) 2.610*** (0.445) 
    2006 1.570+ (0.412) 4.008*** (1.163) 
    2007 1.398 (0.368) 2.675** (0.807) 
    2008 1.572 (0.623) 3.646*** (1.204) 
N 406 406              
Pseudo R2 0.199   0.229              
Year FE X X 
Company FE X X 
 Clustered St. Errors X   X   
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table C2: Count model results for company fixed-effects and treatment effects for each 
company. 
 
Global US 
  
Global US 
  Coeff. SD Coeff. SD (cont.) Coeff. SD Coeff. SD 
GE 1.987** (0.434) 1.804*** (0.305) Westinghouse 0.948 (0.201) 0.595*** (0.092) 
    1988 1.223 (0.154) 1.671*** (0.238)     1988 1.087 (0.132) 2.196*** (0.312) 
    1989 1.067 (0.287) 1.639* (0.387)     1989 1.342 (0.350) 2.913*** (0.658) 
    1990 2.204*** (0.491) 3.619*** (0.369)     1990 0.949 (0.205) 2.421*** (0.221) 
    1991 2.174** (0.605) 4.212*** (0.711)     1991 0.899 (0.243) 2.416*** (0.381) 
    1992 1.569 (0.453) 3.460*** (0.674)     1992 0.513* (0.143) 1.425+ (0.263) 
    1993 1.091 (0.326) 1.890* (0.487)     1993 0.423** (0.124) 0.955 (0.236) 
    1994 0.674 (0.235) 1.470* (0.268)     1994 0.565+ (0.194) 1.943*** (0.338) 
    1995 0.958 (0.338) 2.193** (0.545)     1995 0.352** (0.122) 1.166 (0.276) 
    1996 0.666 (0.216) 1.18 (0.337)     1996 0.465* (0.148) 1.193 (0.324) 
    1997 0.871 (0.375) 1.597 (0.787)     1997 0.220*** (0.094) 0.418+ (0.201) 
    1998 1.467 (0.463) 2.180* (0.700)     1998 0.0699*** (0.022) 2.9e-10*** (0.000) 
    1999 2.368** (0.702) 3.439*** (1.165) N 435 435              
    2000 2.841*** (0.901) 4.100*** (1.352) Pseudo R2 0.221   0.247              
    2001 2.207** (0.667) 3.542*** (1.323) Year FE X X 
    2002 2.379** (0.635) 3.567*** (0.956) Company FE X X 
    2003 1.550+ (0.354) 2.392*** (0.479) Clustered SE X   X   
    2004 1.739*** (0.291) 2.269*** (0.411) Standard errors in parentheses 
    2005 1.771** (0.348) 2.465*** (0.391) + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
    2006 1.989*** (0.409) 3.643*** (1.024) 
    2007 1.737* (0.373) 2.111** (0.564) 
    2008 2.381*** (0.559) 4.716*** (1.180) 
SWPC 0.437*** (0.090) 0.278*** (0.042) 
    1988 0.674*** (0.077) 1.084 (0.153) 
    1989 0.808 (0.205) 0.733 (0.163) 
    1990 0.686+ (0.143) 1.036 (0.090) 
    1991 0.520* (0.136) 0.739* (0.107) 
    1992 0.648 (0.177) 1.663** (0.290) 
    1993 0.367*** (0.105) 0.908 (0.215) 
    1994 0.460* (0.155) 0.734+ (0.122) 
    1995 0.535+ (0.182) 0.998 (0.234) 
    1996 1.397 (0.437) 1.178 (0.314) 
    1997 2.389* (1.005) 2.681* (1.285) 
    1998 2.878*** (0.872) 3.537*** (1.075) 
    1999 1.571 (0.446) 1.860+ (0.604) 
    2000 2.739** (0.840) 3.020*** (0.954) 
    2001 2.346** (0.684) 3.924*** (1.429) 
    2002 3.374*** (0.869) 6.108*** (1.578) 
    2003 2.903*** (0.640) 4.836*** (0.948) 
    2004 3.280*** (0.518) 5.078*** (0.908) 
    2005 2.944*** (0.567) 8.254*** (1.487) 
    2006 4.077*** (0.816) 12.73*** (3.832) 
    2007 3.639*** (0.745) 9.387*** (2.597) 
    2008 3.216*** (0.726) 8.299*** (2.159) 
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Table C3: Citations model results for participants. 
 
US 
Effect Coeff. St. Dev. 
    1988 0.886 (0.118) 
    1989 0.871 (0.228) 
    1990 0.957 (0.074) 
    1991 1.046 (0.049) 
    1992 0.984 (0.082) 
    1993 1.123 (0.214) 
    1994 1.161 (0.112) 
    1995 1.096 (0.243) 
    1996 1.173 (0.226) 
    1997 0.969 (0.121) 
    1998 0.957 (0.201) 
    1999 0.917 (0.130) 
    2000 0.985 (0.243) 
    2001 0.88 (0.115) 
    2002 0.997 (0.240) 
    2003 1.15 (0.179) 
    2004 1.305* (0.150) 
    2005 1.423* (0.244) 
    2006 1.284 (0.212) 
    2007 0.791 (0.197) 
    2008 0.929 (0.392) 
N 7,943 
Pseudo R2 0.0724   
Year FE X 
Company FE X 
Clustered St. Errors X   
Standard errors in parentheses  
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table C4: Citation model results for company fixed-effects and treatment effects for each 
company. 
 
US 
  
US 
  Coeff. St. Dev. (cont.) Coeff. St. Dev. 
GE 1.956*** (0.150) Westinghouse 1.131 (0.092) 
    1988 0.806* (0.073)     1988 1.393*** (0.121) 
    1989 0.708* (0.122)     1989 1.440* (0.254) 
    1990 0.949 (0.071)     1990 0.906 (0.063) 
    1991 1.028 (0.045)     1991 0.832*** (0.038) 
    1992 0.934 (0.067)     1992 0.946 (0.072) 
    1993 0.96 (0.089)     1993 2.437*** (0.230) 
    1994 1.134 (0.103)     1994 1.491*** (0.142) 
    1995 0.929 (0.125)     1995 2.047*** (0.278) 
    1996 1.083 (0.186)     1996 1.436* (0.251) 
    1997 0.898 (0.088)     1997 1.285* (0.127) 
    1998 0.806* (0.084) N 7943              
    1999 0.819* (0.067) Pseudo R2 0.0736              
    2000 0.82 (0.112) Year FE X 
    2001 0.790** (0.057) Company FE X 
    2002 0.803** (0.061) Clustered SE X   
    2003 1.037 (0.118) Standard errors in parentheses 
    2004 1.211* (0.106) + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
    2005 1.264+ (0.152) 
    2006 1.145 (0.130) 
    2007 0.683+ (0.136) 
    2008 0.693 (0.200) 
SWPC 1.550*** (0.159) 
    1988 0.492*** (0.056) 
    1989 1.116 (0.214) 
    1990 0.350*** (0.032) 
    1991 0.618*** (0.043) 
    1992 0.840+ (0.080) 
    1993 0.636*** (0.074) 
    1994 0.638*** (0.072) 
    1995 1.235 (0.202) 
    1996 1.438+ (0.281) 
    1997 0.925 (0.118) 
    1998 1.261+ (0.157) 
    1999 1.002 (0.107) 
    2000 1.691*** (0.269) 
    2001 0.922 (0.081) 
    2002 1.465*** (0.127) 
    2003 1.199 (0.164) 
    2004 1.245* (0.137) 
    2005 1.543** (0.215) 
    2006 1.384* (0.194) 
    2007 0.893 (0.195) 
    2008 1.618 (0.496) 
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Appendix D: Company Results for GE and SWPC Only 
 
Figure D1: Subgraphs D-C and D-D display subgraphs 5-C and 5-D from the main text without 
separating out Westinghouse from SWPC patents for the count results. 
 
 
 
Figure D2: Citation coefficients similar to Figure 6-C in the main text but without separating out 
Westinghouse from SWPC patents for the citation results. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
Policy Anticipation and Capacity Investment: Air Quality Standards and the Natural Gas 
Capacity Boom 
 
1. Introduction 
 Natural gas capacity in the US electricity sector experienced unprecedented growth from 
2000-2003 (Figure 1 & 2), with a surge of new and expanded electric generation units, 
particularly utilizing natural gas combined cycle gas turbine technology (NGCC). This represents 
a large, sudden investment in natural-gas fired power plants, which typically require a long 
planning and pay-back period. Research has cited numerous reasons for the early 21st century 
uptick in natural gas capacity including changes in technology feasibility, fuel prices, energy 
demand, domestic supply of natural gas, storage capacity, natural gas transportation 
infrastructure, and energy and environmental policies (Joskow, 2006 & 2011; Kaplan, 2010; 
Levi, 2013; Rao, 2012). Since investment decisions for capacity installation require planning 
time, it is also possible anticipation of impending policy changes influenced this capacity 
growth, which has not been considered in previous study of the natural gas capacity boom. 
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Figure 1: Increases in US natural gas, renewables, and all other fuels versus total capacity retired 
from 1997-2009 in GW/year. 
 
Figure 2: Changes in natural gas capacity versus all other fuels for existing power plant sector in 
2009. 
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In 1997, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) changed the format of the 
ozone and particulate matter (PM) National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), 
effectively raising the stringency of the standards (Bell & Eliss, 2003), resulting in hundreds of 
counties being designated as nonattainment. Areas not meeting the NAAQS and designated as 
nonattainment are subjected to stricter construction regulations requiring emissions offsets and 
the most stringent air pollution control standards (Bachman, 2007; Frey, 2012). The normal time 
period between promulgation of new NAAQS and nonattainment designation is typically four 
years; however in this case designations did not take place until 2004 for ozone and 2005 for PM 
due to both expected and unexpected delays.  
Since power plants must have permits to emit air pollution, there is reason to believe that 
areas expecting stricter building regulations may have rushed to complete planned capacity 
installations before new environmental regulations took place. Previous studies have considered 
the role of regulation on technology adoption and diffusion (Ishii, 2011; Popp, 2010; Frey, 
2012), finding a strong link in both cases. Other studies have estimated the costs of regulatory 
uncertainty in the environmental sector as a result of regulatory delays, leakage, or other sources 
of inefficiencies (Bosetti & Victor, 2011; Reinelt & Keith, 2007). Absent the many sources of 
regulatory uncertainty regarding pollution policy, such as low credibility, politics, or market 
volatility, these studies find decision-makers choose to invest in cleaner technologies while 
anticipating environmental regulations. According to this literature, emitters in areas that 
anticipate new regulations with more certainty act sooner and more aggressively than other areas. 
The NAAQS have existed since the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments, with the earliest reviews 
of these standards beginning in 1975 (Bachman, 2007). This established process for making 
nonattainment designations occurs with higher amounts of predictability than implementation of 
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newer environmental policies, such as those aimed at reducing carbon emissions. The well-
communicated, long lead time leading up to policy implementation provided investors plenty of 
time to act as well. 
Prior studies of the natural gas capacity boom generally considered the influence of 
various technological and energy policy factors without quantifying the effects (Joskow 2006 & 
2011; Rao, 2012; Levi, 2013). Or, studies look at characteristics of the firm (e.g. size, age, etc.) 
and ownership (e.g. independent power producer, or public-owned utility) that may influence 
electricity capacity installation decisions (Frey, 2012; Rose & Joskow, 1990). This study 
uniquely decomposes the boom in natural gas capacity empirically, specifically considering the 
role of policy anticipation that is in effect in some areas but not others in the presence of 
controls. 
In order to study the role of policy anticipation on natural gas capacity growth, I use 
several difference-in-difference models. The pre-policy period, the time after the new standards 
were announced but before nonattainment designations were issued, is the time period of 
interest. The technology adoption decision in this case includes the decision to build a power 
plant, which type of plant (and thus, the fuel source) to build, how large the plant should be, and 
where it should be located. The format of this study addresses whether any new natural gas 
capacity was built using a linear probability difference-in-difference model, as well as the 
quantity of how much natural gas capacity was built using a continuous difference-in-difference 
model. I find that areas expecting nonattainment were more likely to build natural gas capacity 
before the designation, and built a total of 45-74% more natural gas capacity than areas not 
expecting nonattainment. 
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The growing complexity of the environmental regulatory process, decreased budgets for 
environmental institutions, and increased frequency of court challenges contribute to longer 
implementation periods for environmental policy (Rosenbaum, 2013). In an environment with 
frequent regulatory delays, policy anticipation may become more important in investment 
decisions. This paper begins with a background on NGCC technology and the natural gas 
capacity boom. Following this, a brief description of changes in the NAAQS is presented and 
theory on how policy anticipation and other controls influenced investment decisions. After a 
description of the models and data, the results of these models are presented and discussed. 
2. Background 
2.1 Natural Gas Capacity Boom 
The natural gas capacity building boom peaked in 2002 with about 56 GW of new 
capacity installation, which is approximately 5% of the total US capacity as of 2009 (Figure 1). 
The adoption curves (Griliches, 1957) for different technologies based on the 2009 fleet of 
power plants shows a variety of “S” curves, none as sharp and pronounced as the recent adoption 
of new natural gas capacity (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Cumulative capacity of different technologies by installment year based on 2009 fleet 
of power plants. 
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New installations of natural gas capacity came from both NGCC and single-cycle gas 
turbine (GT) units during the 2001-2003 boom in natural gas capacity across the country (Figure 
4). NGCC units include both a gas turbine and heat recovery steam turbine that reuses the waste 
heat from the gas turbine for high efficiency generation. Due to lower levels of impurities in 
natural gas compared to coal, and high thermal conversion efficiency of NGCC plants,51 NGCC 
generators produce up to 60% less carbon dioxide (CO2), 80-90% lower nitrogen oxides (NOx), 
and negligible amounts of particulate matter (PM) and sulfur dioxide (SO2).
52 NGCC units are 
typically larger than GT generators and built to support both peaking and baseload operations, 
and approximately 70% of the new natural gas capacity that came online from 2001-2003 was 
installed as a NGCC unit. 
Figure 4: Map of natural gas generators in the US, with those installed before 1999 in blue, and 
from 1999-2009 in green, sized by capacity of the generation unit. 
 
                                                          
51 It should be noted that recent literature argues the lifecycle methane emissions of unconventional natural gas 
burned in a NGCC ultimately leave a higher greenhouse gas footprint than coal generation due to hydraulic 
fracturing extraction methods for shale gas (Howarth 2014). EPA and others continue to conduct more research to 
understand the impact of upstream methane emissions on the lifecycle CO2 emissions reductions from NGCC. 
52 Nitrogen dioxide is a precursor to ozone, and both NOx and SO2 are precursors to particulate matter (PM). 
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NGCC plants can be built relatively quickly and cheaply, requiring about half the time 
and capital cost of a typical coal-fired plant. The EIA reports in 2010 that the overnight capital 
cost for conventional NGCC plants was $978/kW, compared to a single unit advanced pulverized 
coal plant at $3,167/kW (in 2010 dollars).53 In the 2000Annual Energy Outlook,54 the EIA 
projects that natural gas would far outpace coal in new capacity due to lower capital costs, 
shorter construction lead times, higher efficiencies, and lower emissions. In most cases, the 
decision to build a power plant includes a proposal by a firm, approval by a Public Utility 
Commission, a permitting process, and a 2 year lead time for NGCC plant construction process 
before the plant is operational.55  
2.2 NAAQS Changes 
The NAAQS serve as one of the primary means for controlling air quality through the 
use of standards for criteria pollutants to protect public health and welfare. In accordance with 
the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, EPA must review the NAAQS every five years to keep 
these standards appropriately protective in light of current scientific research. In 1997 following 
court-ordered reviews of the NAAQS, EPA moved from a 1-hour time averaging standard to an 
8-hour standard for ozone, and added PM2.5 as a criteria pollutant, resulting in new 
nonattainment areas for ozone and PM.56  
                                                          
53 The EIA report, “Updated Capital Cost Estimates for Electricity Generation Plants” (2010) is available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/powerplants/capitalcost/archive/2010/pdf/updatedplantcosts.pdf. 
54 The 2000 EIA Annual Energy Outlook is available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/outlooks/archive/aeo00/pdf/0383(2000).pdf. 
55 The EIA report, “Updated Capital Cost Estimates for Electricity Generation Plants” (2010) is available at: 
http://www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/powerplants/capitalcost/archive/2010/pdf/updatedplantcosts.pdf.  
56 US EPA “Table of Historical Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)” available at: 
https://www.epa.gov/ozone-pollution/table-historical-ozone-national-ambient-air-quality-standards-naaqs, and 
“Particulate Matter (PM) Standards – Table of Historical PM NAAQS” available at 
https://www3.epa.gov/ttn/naaqs/standards/pm/s_pm_history.html. 
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Projects in nonattainment areas, or areas that are not meeting the NAAQS, are subjected 
to stricter construction and operation standards, which particularly impacts construction of new 
electric utility or industrial sources (Bachmann, 2007). Specifically, new sources in 
nonattainment areas must follow Nonattainment New Source Review procedures and meet 
Lowest Achievable Emissions Rates - the most stringent air pollution control standard in the 
Clean Air Act short of banning construction. 
Designations resulting from the revisions to the ozone and PM standards in 1997 did not 
take place until 2004 and 2005, respectively, due to several bureaucratic steps in the policy 
process and court challenges. After promulgation of new NAAQS, states are required to collect 
three years of monitoring data before submitting a nonattainment recommendation to the EPA 
Administrator following specific guidance from EPA.57 Once EPA receives a recommendation 
from a state, EPA responds with its designation, which it cannot finalize for at least forty days, 
giving states time to challenge the designation. In addition, President Clinton issued a 
memorandum with the promulgation of the 1997 standards that provided supplementary 
guidance on implementation of the new standards. This granted EPA and the states even more 
time before designations were finalized to allow additional flexibility and reduce economic 
burdens on states and firms. Litigation of both standards further delayed actual attainment 
designations (Bachman, 2007). Investors and state regulators could have expected at least three 
to four years from promulgation of the standards to final designation, and in this case faced even 
more time. 
                                                          
57 EPA guidance indicates that metropolitan statistical areas that have design values exceeding the new standards are 
considered nonattainment. These “design values” are based on three year averages of air quality, therefore states 
have up to three years to collect monitoring data for their nonattainment recommendations. Thus, air quality from 
1998-2000 needed to be collected before states could submit a recommendation for ozone nonattainment. 
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Regulators and industry first officially become aware of anticipated changes in the 
NAAQS with the NAAQS proposals appearing in the Federal Register in December 1996. 
States maintain air quality monitoring continuously, and know at any point in time if they are 
meeting the NAAQS based on most recent design values. In the case of PM2.5, while new 
monitoring instruments were required, modeling predictions and PM10 measurements provided 
states adequate estimates of anticipated levels. Further, since designations are based on three 
year averages, in the first year collecting data states can reasonably project if they will have 
nonattainment areas. This is well communicated to regulated industry through websites, 
workshops, and outreach events by state agencies and regional and Federal EPA offices. 
Therefore, investors and regulators are typically able to anticipate nonattainment designations. 
Areas that were designated nonattainment under the new 1997 ozone and PM2.5 standards are 
below in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Areas that were designated as nonattainment for PM2.5 and ozone, ozone only, or 
PM2.5 only based on the 1997 standards and severity of nonattainment. 
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In addition to designating an area as nonattainment, the EPA also classified these areas 
based on the severity of nonattainment. More offsets are mandated in areas with severe 
nonattainment; to facilitate achievement, they receive later compliance dates. With respect to the 
1997 standards, EPA designated areas based on seven classification levels for ozone, and three 
classification levels for PM, seen in Table 1 and Figure 5. 
Since ozone and PM share some precursor pollutants, many of the areas with PM 
nonattainment also experienced ozone nonattainment. Table 1 shows how many counties 
designated nonattainment for each classification level were also designated nonattainment (of 
any classification) of both pollutants for the 1997 NAAQS.58 There were more ozone 
nonattainment areas in general, with about 40% of all ozone nonattainment areas also designated 
nonattainment based on PM2.5. Of the PM2.5 nonattainment areas, 85% of them were also 
designated nonattainment for ozone, with all “serious” PM2.5 nonattainment classifications also 
designated nonattainment for ozone. 
Upon promulgation of the standards in 1997, areas knew reasonably well if they would 
have difficulty meeting the standards. Therefore, firms in areas that anticipated nonattainment 
designations may have been more likely to build new electric capacity before the more stringent 
building regulations became effective. Further, firms in areas with existing, “dirty” capacity 
                                                          
58 EPA used Clean Air Act § 172 (42 U.S.C. §85(I)(D)(1) (1)) to designate all nonattainment areas with a 1-hr ozone 
design value of less than 0.121 ppm as a “general” ozone nonattainment area, which had similar requirements to a 
“moderate” classification. EPA then classified all areas above the 1-hr threshold as marginal, moderate, serious, 
severe, or extreme with the associated requirements. However, the use of the 1-hr design value to determine if an 
area was “general” or “classifiable” nonattainment for the 8-hr standard was vacated by the D.C. Circuit Court in 
2006 after initial designation, and the remaining subpart 1 “general” nonattainment areas were classified as 
moderate nonattainment areas in 2012. These areas remained nonattainment as long as the 8-hr design value was 
exceeding the 1997 standard, only the classification was revoked. Hence, these areas are titled as “Former Subpart 
1” nonattainment areas. PM2.5 “general” nonattainment classifications were not formally challenged in court, 
however were also redesignated to “moderate” classification in 2011. 
   
 
58 
may have been more likely to build new, cleaner capacity in anticipation of tighter operating 
regulations. 
Table 1: Count of counties designated nonattainment by different classification levels for the 
1997 ozone and PM2.5 standards. 
 
Ozone 
 
PM2.5 
Class Count Also PM 
 
Count Also Ozone 
1. Former Subpart 1  136 56 
 
106 89 
2. Marginal 75 8 
 
0 0 
3. Moderate 181 96 
 
94 81 
4. Serious 16 6 
 
8 8 
5. Extreme 9 9 
 
0 0 
6. Severe 15 17 3 
 
0 0 
7. Severe 17 2 0 
 
0 0 
Total 436 178 
 
208 178 
2.3 Other Factors 
Outside of the technological advantages of NGCC and regulatory changes, there are 
several other factors to consider while evaluating changes in capacity. One could expect an 
overall increase in capacity with growing electricity demands, particularly in areas with growing 
population or industry. For example, the EIA Energy Outlook in 1995 hypothesized that the 
information technology boom of the 1990s and increased sales of appliances would lead to 
increased energy demand in certain areas.59 However, the immense peak in construction of one 
specific fuel-technology combination, as seen from 2001-2003 with NGCC, is rare. EIA data 
shows that recently retired capacity (from 2001-2009) is about 8% of total new capacity 
installations (from 2001-2009) (Figure 1).60 This shows that the majority of new capacity 
installations were not likely stemming from a need to replace retired capacity. 
                                                          
59 EIA’s Energy Outlook in 1995 is available at: http://www.eia.gov/outlooks/archive/aeo95/pdf/0383(95).pdf. 
60 I conducted sensitivity tests that included a variable for concurrent and lagged retirements. Since this value is 
small during the pre-policy period of interest, it did not have a significant impact on the results. Further, closer 
examination in the EIA-860 data time series reveals multiple units once designated retired come out of retirement or 
are moved to standby and then later retired. For these reasons I do not include a retirement variable in the analysis. 
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In addition to changes in electricity demand, factors regarding the supply of fuel may also 
impact new capacity installation. Over time, prices of natural gas have been volatile, and 
generally growing since late 1990s until more recent declines (Figure 6). Rao (2012) shows that 
new NGCC plants become competitive with coal plants when natural gas prices are below $7.40 
per million metric British thermal unit (MMBtu), and between $10.00 and $12.80 supposing a 
carbon penalty.61 The average citygate price of natural gas was $6.15 MMBtu62 from 1998-2004, 
and below $7.40 per MMBtu for most of this time period.  
 
Figure 6: Box-plot of state-averaged annual citygate natural gas prices for the states included in 
this analysis (i.e. all states except Alaska and Hawaii) in 2010 dollars. 
                                                          
61 These numbers are based on the average price for plants with various capacity and capacity factors from the 
original report cited in Rao (2012) from Wynne, Broquin, and Singh’s 2010 Bernstein Report titled, “US utilities: 
Coal-fired generation is squeezed in the vice of EPA regulation; who wins and who loses?” 
62 Based on the annual, national average citygate price of natural gas in 2010 dollars, available at: 
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_pri_sum_a_EPG0_PG1_DMcf_m.htm. 
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In addition to low natural gas prices in the 1990’s, natural gas prices were forecasted to 
stay low through the early 2000s, further incentivizing investment in natural gas power plants. In 
the 1995 Annual Energy Outlook (AEO),63the EIA predicted that natural gas prices delivered to 
the electricity sector would remain around $2-$3 in 1995 dollars per MMBtu through 2015. It 
cites Federal and State initiatives for increased competition in the natural gas market would keep 
prices low, and assuming slow economic growth would stabilize gas prices and higher 
production. 
Natural gas availability also has an influence on the choice to construct more natural gas 
facilities. Recent changes in extraction technology – namely horizontal drilling and hydraulic 
fracturing – have led to large changes in the estimated natural gas reserves available at lower 
prices (Shahidehpour, 2005). However, the shale gas revolution generally began in 2007, years 
after the 2000-2003 natural gas capacity buildout, and is therefore not being considered in this 
study as a potential factor in the early 2000s capacity boom. 
Natural gas generation also requires storage and transportation infrastructure. Previous 
studies have found that transmission of natural gas has become easier as electricity infrastructure 
has improved over time (Shahidehpour, 2005). A dense network of pipelines supplies natural gas 
for home heating and power plant purposes across the country. According to my calculations 
using EIA and eGRID data, about 26% of new natural gas capacity in the boom years went into 
areas that had no natural gas generating capacity before. This suggests these areas may have 
experienced improvements or expansions of natural gas pipelines which allowed natural gas 
capacity to be built in the area for the first time. However, most of the new capacity (74%) went 
into areas with preexisting natural gas-fired generation units that therefore already had large-
capacity pipelines in the area. 
                                                          
63 The EIA AEO for 1995 is available at: http://www.eia.gov/outlooks/archive/aeo95/pdf/0383(95).pdf. 
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Additionally, restructuring of the electricity industry took place around the time period of 
the natural gas boom. From 1997-2004 multiple states passed legislation to deregulate their 
electricity markets. However, to different degrees, some states either halted or even reversed 
their deregulation efforts after complications in California and international markets following 
deregulation. There are competing theories as to how deregulation or market restructuring may 
impact capacity investment. Critics of rate-of-return regulation in traditional markets (absent 
competition) argue utilities have the incentive to invest in higher cost capacity under the 
likelihood that rate increase requests would be approved, also known as the Averch-Johnson 
effect (Averch-Johnson, 1962). This is one argument for why deregulation, and the introduction 
of competition, would help lower costs in the electric utility sector and could lead to less new 
natural gas capacity in deregulated areas. Recent work by Knittel et al. (2015) finds restructured 
markets had reduced investment in NGCC, post-restructuring, compared to traditional markets 
due to the absence of long-term contracts. They find this reduced NGCC capacity has limited the 
ability for fuel-switching between coal and natural gas plants as natural gas prices started 
dropping in 2009. 
However, opposing theories argue that deregulation decentralized capacity planning 
decisions, which may have led to rapid construction of capacity. In interviews with plant 
managers, plants in deregulated areas were less likely to believe their competitor’s plans for 
capacity growth. In general, they were optimistic other plants would not be able to accomplish 
their full construction goals, and would pursue larger capacity gains of their own in attempts to 
grab a larger piece of the potential profit (Kadoya et al., 2005). As mentioned in the section on 
natural gas capacity, NGCC plants can be constructed faster and are more suitable for peaking 
purposes than a traditional coal or nuclear plant. For these reasons, it is possible that more 
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NGCC plants were constructed to take advantage of higher spot-market prices during peaking 
operations when energy prices are at their highest in competitive markets (Ford, 2002). 
Previous literature largely concludes that deregulated areas will have more new natural 
gas capacity installation since they may attract more independent power producers (IPPs) (Ishii, 
2011)—which were responsible for 80% of the new capacity installations during this time 
(Joskow, 2006)—and were thus subject to decentralized capacity planning (Ford, 2009; Kadoya 
et al., 2005). However, other studies have found conflicting results leaving it possible that 
deregulated states were less likely to invest in new capacity following Averch-Johnson (Frey, 
2012). For these reasons, I include a control for states with wholesale market competition in the 
models. In Appendix B I explore the impact of regulatory evolution on natural gas capacity 
growth further with additional analysis. 
This section describes the many different factors that may affect new natural gas capacity 
investment. Research has generally stated that changes in technology feasibility, population, 
industry, retirements, fuel prices, market restructuring, and transportation infrastructure have 
contributed to this boom in natural gas capacity installation. These factors are included as other 
independent variables in this study or more generally controlled for using fixed-effects, 
described further in the next section. 
3. Analysis 
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
I use several datasets with information on power plants and area characteristics to 
construct a strongly balanced panel for 1997-2009. I primarily depend on Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) generator and plant data reported in EIA 860 forms for capacity and plant 
characteristics. Additionally, I used EPA’s Emissions & Generation Resource Integrated 
Database (eGRID) to determine which plants are in the power sector. While the dataset covers 
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1996-2009, the dependent variable is the change in natural gas capacity, therefore the regression 
dataset runs from 1997-2009 (Table 2). I removed generators that were not recorded as 
“operating” in the EIA data. This removes plants that were under construction, out of service, 
planned, retired, on standby, or operating under test conditions. Further, plants identified as 
combined heat and power plants were removed from the dataset since they typically do not 
dispatch to the grid. 
The ozone and PM nonattainment data and nonattainment severity information are from 
the EPA Green Book. The state citygate price of natural gas is provided by EIA, and population 
change from 2000 and 2010 at the county level is from US Census data. Gross domestic product 
(GDP) data is from the US Bureau of Economic Statistics and is the real GDP in chained 2009 
dollars.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics and definitions of variables. 
Variable Description Units Equation Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
ln NG cap change 
Difference in the logs of natural gas capacity 
year to year 
ln(MW) ln(NG capt) - ln(NG capt-1) 13,656 0.082 0.62 -0.223 7.795 
NG build 
= 1 if new NG capacity was built in the area 
that year, 0 otherwise 
  
13,656 0.044 0.204 0 1 
NG cap change Difference in natural gas capacity year to year MW (NG capt) - (NG capt-1) 13,656 18 130 -359 4,428 
preOzone*Ozone interaction variable for ozone DID 
 
preOzone * Ozone 1997 treated 13,656 0.079 0.269 0 1 
prePM*PM interaction variable for PM DID 
 
prePM * PM 1997 treated 13,656 0.044 0.204 0 1 
Ozone 1997 treated 
=1 if the area was designated nonattainment 
for ozone 1997, 0 otherwise 
  
13,656 0.157 0.364 0 1 
PM 1997 treated 
=1 if the area was designated nonattainment 
for PM 1997, 0 otherwise 
  
13,656 0.075 0.263 0 1 
preOzone =1 if year is 1998-2003, 0 otherwise 
  
13,656 0.5 0.5 0 1 
prePM =1 if year is 1998-2004, 0 otherwise 
  
13,656 0.583 0.493 0 1 
Ozone NAA 
=1  when any ozone nonattainment for any 
ozone standard, 0 otherwise 
  
13,656 0.115 0.318 0 1 
PM NAA 
=1 when any PM nonattainment for any PM 
standard, 0 otherwise 
  
13,656 0.073 0.26 0 1 
Restructure 
=1 in the year state introduced wholesale 
market competition, 0 otherwise 
  
13,656 0.571 0.494 0 1 
Pop change percent Percent change in population 2010-2000 % (pop2010 - pop2000)/pop2000 13,656 0.062 0.1 -0.499 0.547 
ln(NG P) 
Natural log of annual average Citygate natural 
gas price in real 2010 dollars 
ln($ chained 2010) ln(NG P)t-3 13,656 1.759 0.307 1.38 2.27 
ln GDP change 
Difference in the logs of GDP in chained 2009 
dollars 
ln($ chained 2009) ln(GDPt) - ln(GDPt-1) 13,656 0.021 0.027 -0.097 0.113 
ln(initial cap) 
Natural log of initial nameplate capacity for all 
generation types, 0 if there was no initial 
capacity 
ln(MW) ln(Total nameplate) 13,656 4.196 2.651 0 9.474 
Severe 
=1 if ozone or PM nonattainment classification 
serious, extreme, or severe  
 
13,656 0.008 0.089 0 1 
Total nameplate 
Total nameplate capacity for all generation 
types 
MW 
 
13,656 781 1,563 0 17,153 
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3.2 Empirical Model 
To measure the impact of nonattainment anticipation on capacity investment, I use a 
difference-in-difference (DID) model to examine variation in capacity growth during the pre-
policy period between areas expecting nonattainment designations following the new NAAQS 
and those that did not. The DID model compares the average gain from before and after a policy 
takes place in the treated group with a control group. A typical DID model is interested in the 
difference after the policy takes place; however, since the anticipation of nonattainment is the 
policy variable of interest in this study, I am focusing on the pre-policy period when the effect is 
expected to take place. A DID is ideal in this case because multiple groups and time periods are 
present in this dataset in order to identify a causal effect. I also include a linear probability model 
(LPM) version of the DID to analyze the probability of any new natural gas capacity being built 
in a zone, versus how much new natural gas capacity was built in the regular DID model.  
The unit of analysis in this study is census-based electricity “zones” of roughly 780 MW 
capacity (Table 2). The zones are based on 2009 census Core Based Statistical Areas (CBSAs)64 
of metropolitan and micropolitan areas (Figure 7). Each facility is assigned to a zone based on 
the CBSA it falls in, or if it does not fall within the boundaries of a CBSA, which CBSA it is 
closest to. If facilities are outside of the state containing the CBSA it is closest to, I create a new 
zone for that CBSA with the state the facilities reside in. The zones are further delineated for 
those facilities that reside within the boundaries of the CBSA or outside of the boundaries of the 
CBSA since they may behave differently. Therefore, the zones are CBSA-state areas for 
facilities that are either inside or outside the boundaries of the CBSA.65 There are 1,138 zones 
                                                          
64 Previously known as metropolitan statistical areas, or MSAs. 
65 For example, there are several facilities with the closest CBSA the Dothan, Alabama metropolitan area that fall 
within the state boundaries of Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. Therefore, the Dothan metropolitan area will have 
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each year that remain fixed throughout the dataset. These zones are not as fine as county level 
jurisdictions, but not as coarse as state jurisdictions, and I attach the relevant policies to each 
zone. The standard errors are clustered at the CBSA level since the same CBSA is connected to 
several zones in some cases.
 
Figure 7: Changes in natural gas capacity from 1997-2009 aggregated by CBSA. 
The dependent variable in the DID is the difference in the natural log of natural gas 
capacity from one year to the next (ln NG cap change). The dependent variable in the LPM DID 
model (NG build) is a dummy variable, coded as 1 if the zone built any natural gas capacity in 
that year, 0 otherwise. The DID model (equation 1) includes state ( ) and year fixed-effects 
( ) to control for all unobservable stationary statewide and time effects.66 For example, other 
policies, or changes in demand from sources not included in the model can be controlled using 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
four zones: in Alabama and in Dothan metropolitan area, in Alabama but not within Dothan metropolitan area, in 
Georgia but not within Dothan metropolitan area, and in Florida but not within Dothan metropolitan area. 
66 Sensitivity tests were conducted using individual fixed-effects. The interaction variables remained significant and 
of similar magnitudes, however further information on the other control variables was lost, therefore these results 
are not included in this study. 
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these area and time fixed-effects. The model also includes robust and clustered standard errors 
based on nearest metropolitan area to address heteroskedasticity and potential correlations 
among the errors within a region. The variables preOzone*Ozone and prePM*PM are the 
interaction variables of interest ( ( ∙ )) indicating the observations took place 
during nonattainment anticipation (e.g. preOzone, 1998-2003 for ozone and 1998-2004 for PM) 
and in areas that were eventually designated nonattainment (e.g. Ozone 1997 treated). The 
inclusion of these variables in the model captures possible differences between the treated and 
control groups after the pre-policy period, while the time period dummy controls for other 
unobservable factors that may have caused a difference in the pre-policy period absent the 
policy. 
 
=  + ( ∙ ) + + + + + +  (eq. 1) 
 
I also include a model testing the different levels of classification of nonattainment to see 
if firms in areas with higher pollution levels built (or were more likely to build) more natural gas 
capacity than in areas with lower pollution levels. In order to test this, I run the LPM DID with 
the same controls but with an additional “severe” variable indicating which preOzone*Ozone and 
prePM*PM were also above moderate classification (i.e. serious, extreme, or severe). I use the 
LPM version of the DID because there are a limited number of observations fitting this “severe” 
criteria, and it is statistically simpler to determine if building occurred at all versus how much in 
a continuous model. 
There are several control variables included to address other factors that might contribute 
to changes in natural gas capacity ( ). The Pop change percent variable is the percentage 
change in population for the counties of each CBSA from 2000 to 2010. Restructure follows 
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Craig and Savage (2013) conventions of coding all states with access to wholesale markets (i.e. 
“partial competition”) as 1, beginning in the year the state adopted the initiative to restructure, 
leaving states with traditional markets coded 0 (Appendix A). The ln(NG P)t-3 variable is the 
annual state average citygate price of natural gas at a three year lag.67 I ran sensitivity tests on 
several different lags of natural gas prices from concurrent to six year lags. The overall R-
squared measure of fit, and DID interaction coefficients of interest did not change with the 
different lags of natural gas prices, indicating that any year of lagged natural gas prices is 
orthogonal to the interaction variables. Therefore, I decided to use the three year lag price (t-3) 
which represents the price of natural gas when the decision to build new capacity was typically 
being made. The ln GDP change variable is the difference in the natural log of gross domestic 
product from one year to the next for each state to control for changes in industrial activity. On 
average, nonattainment areas have a larger capacity than areas with no nonattainment 
designations resulting from the 1997 standards, as they are typically more metropolitan areas. 
For this reason, I include a control for initial capacity (ln(initial cap)). I also include a variable 
controlling for nonattainment status based on previous NAAQS standards for each pollutant (e.g. 
ozoneNAAit). All of the variables are described further in Table 2. 
Bertrand et al. (2004) demonstrate that DID standard errors can be biased due to 
autocorrelation. I test for autocorrelation with a Lagrange-Multiplier test which shows there is no 
first-order autocorrelation. I also use a simple test suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004) that 
averages all pre- and post- policy variables and runs the DID on just these two time periods to 
eliminate autocorrelation. These results (not included) contain very similar coefficient values, 
and all interaction variables remain significant at the 94% confidence level, which further 
indicates autocorrelation is not an issue in the original model. 
                                                          
67 However, it is possible that sub-state variation in natural gas prices could matter as well.  
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4. Results & Discussion 
Table 3 contains the results from the DID regressions with the interaction variable 
preOzone*Ozone and prePM*PM as the main variables of interest. Model 1 is the LPM DID 
model with the binary NG Build variable as the dependent variable. Model 2 is the continuous 
DID with ln NG cap change as the dependent variable. Model 3 is the same LPM in model 1 but 
with an additional variable (Severe) indicating if the nonattainment area was classified as serious 
to severe nonattainment. 
The results of the LPM DID show areas anticipating ozone nonattainment, during the pre-
policy period (1998-2003) are 5% more likely to build any new natural gas capacity than other 
areas, while areas anticipating PM nonattainment are 8% more likely to build natural gas 
capacity, per year. Each of these interaction variables is significant at the 99% confidence level 
or above. At the 95% significance level, the same DID interaction variables are significant in the 
continuous DID (model 2) showing areas anticipating ozone nonattainment would have built 
10% more natural gas capacity, while areas anticipating PM nonattainment built 13% more 
natural gas capacity than other areas, per year. Over the six year period anticipating ozone, and 
seven year period anticipating PM nonattainment, this would mean these areas built 45% and 
58% more natural gas capacity, respectively, than areas not anticipating new nonattainment 
designations.68  
As seen in Table 1 and Figure 5, multiple areas faced both ozone and PM nonattainment 
simultaneously. By summing the coefficients from model 1 for preOzone*Ozone and 
prePM*PM, I find that areas anticipating both ozone and PM nonattainment built 23% more 
natural gas capacity than other areas per year, for a cumulative growth of 74% more natural gas 
                                                          
68 This was calculated using the following derived equation to measure how much lower natural gas capacity would 
have been absent nonattainment: %∆ = − 1, where n is the number of years for accumulation, and y is the 
interaction coefficient for the policy. 
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capacity. Using the average natural gas capacity growth during this time of 18 MW per year 
(Table 2), areas expecting both ozone and PM nonattainment built approximately 93 MW more 
new natural gas capacity from 1998-2003 than average, which is on the order of adding an 
additional medium-sized generating unit or small-sized power plant.  
The larger coefficient for the PM interaction in all models indicates PM nonattainment 
anticipation had a greater impact on natural gas capacity growth than ozone nonattainment 
anticipation. While NGCC reduces ozone precursor emissions to 5% of NOx and less than 1% of 
SO2 emissions of coal-steam combustion, it produces only negligible amounts of PM, closer to 
0.01% of coal-steam PM emissions. This large advantage of NGCC in PM reductions to ozone 
precursors may explain why the coefficients on PM interactions are larger than ozone. The 
additional year of anticipation (2004) before designations may also contribute to this difference. 
Looking beyond the interaction variables in the DID models, restructured areas were 3% 
less likely to build new natural gas capacity per year in the LPM model confirming the findings 
from Frey (2012). This supports the hypothesis behind the Averch-Johnson effect suggesting 
deregulated areas would experience less capacity growth absent rate-of-return regulation. The 
citygate price of natural gas at a three year lag is only significant in the continuous DID, 
indicating as natural gas prices increased three years prior, natural gas capacity increased. The 
increase in natural gas price in the early 2000s was in part due to the increased demand caused 
by the natural gas capacity buildout, but also due to several cold winters and limited supply of 
natural gas from decreased drilling and exploration while natural gas prices bottomed out in the 
late 1990s (Neumann & von Hirschhausen, 2015). Intuitively, one would expect low prices of 
natural gas preceding the boom, which was the case in the late 1990s. However, the rapid 
increase in prices in the early 2000s was generally unexpected (Neumann & von Hirschhausen, 
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2015), therefore plans to complete or undertake new building projects may have continued as 
planned despite the sudden uptick in prices. 
The results also show changes in GDP are not significantly related to changes in natural 
gas capacity, but areas with a growing population were more likely to have new natural gas 
capacity built. The initial capacity variable is significant in the LPM and continuous DID, with a 
positive coefficient in the LPM and negative coefficient in the continuous model. This shows 
that areas with larger initial capacity were more likely to build (as expected). However they had 
relatively less natural gas capacity growth, probably because these areas already contained a 
substantial amount of capacity. 
Adding the Severe variable to indicate if areas expecting nonattainment during the pre-
policy period had higher levels of pollution in model 3 does not lead to considerably different 
results from the LPM in model 1. The Severe variable is statistically insignificant in model 3, 
which is likely due to the limited number of areas at this higher severity level (10% for ozone, 
and 3% for PM, Table 1). The coefficients on the interaction variables (preOzone*Ozone and 
prePM*PM) slightly decrease from model 1 upon adding the Severe variable. In the case where 
there is greater variance in the severity of nonattainment, perhaps as NAAQS continue to be 
tightened in later revisions, this type of analysis may provide more insight. Despite very low R-
squared values, all three models pass an F-test indicating the models are statistically significant 
overall. 
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Table 3: Results of LPM (I) and regular DID (II), and LPM DID with nonattainment severity 
(III). 
 
 
(I) NG Build (II) ln NG cap change (III) Severe 
  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Interaction: 
     
     preOzone*Ozone 0.0480*** (0.0143) 0.0986*   (0.0389) 0.0466*** (0.0139) 
    prePM*PM 0.0807** (0.0249) 0.125*   (0.0549) 0.0783**  (0.0280) 
Treated: 
     
     Ozone 1997 treated 0.00165 (0.0973) 0.353 (0.2049) 0.00173 (0.0973) 
PM 1997 treated 0.0323 (0.0506) 0.244*   (0.1065) 0.0325 (0.0506) 
Pre-policy Period: 
     
     preOzone 0.013 (0.0135) 0.0147 (0.0282) 0.0139 (0.0134) 
    prePM -0.0422* (0.0205) -0.038 (0.0285) -0.0411 (0.0211) 
Controls: 
     
     Ozone NAA 0.0369* (0.0143) 0.0366 (0.0314) 0.0356*   (0.0141) 
    PM NAA 0.0459** (0.0159) 0.0296 (0.0239) 0.0446**  (0.0170) 
    Restructure -0.0254*** (0.0074) -0.0437 (0.0263) -0.0255*** (0.0074) 
    Pop change percent 0.160*** (0.0343) 0.131*   (0.0606) 0.159*** (0.0339) 
    ln(NG P) 0.0831 (0.1669) 0.757*   (0.3522) 0.0834 (0.1669) 
    ln GDP change 0.0226 (0.0957) 0.068 (0.2665) 0.022 (0.0958) 
    ln(initial cap) 0.00349** (0.0011) -0.0123*** (0.0025) 0.00351**  (0.0011) 
    Severe 
    
0.0165  (0.0560) 
Constant -0.193 (0.3741) -1.554 (0.7919) -0.193 (0.3741) 
R2 0.0645 
 
0.0244 
 
0.0645 
 N 13,656   13,656   13,656   
State FE X 
 
X 
 
X 
 Year FE X  X  X  
Robust SE X 
 
X 
 
X 
 Cluster (CBSA) X   X   X   
Standard errors in parentheses 
 
  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
   
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
This study finds that areas anticipating nonattainment designations from the 1997 ozone 
and PM2.5 NAAQS changes had 45%-74% more total natural gas capacity growth than other 
areas during the natural gas capacity boom, depending on the pollutant or combination of 
pollutants. Firms in these areas essentially rushed to build planned capacity—using the 
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technology of choice at the time—to avoid building restrictions imposed by nonattainment 
designation. Firms in areas expecting nonattainment had sufficient policy certainty to act 
quickly, with the additional incentive of shortening the time spent in nonattainment. Thus, 
anticipation of stricter environmental regulations affects adoption of new energy technology. 
Because the NAAQS are frequently revised and debated, this study may have relevant 
implications for capacity changes going forward. 
Although these results show that anticipated NAAQS changes had a statistically 
significant impact on NGCC capacity growth, the overall share of the capacity growth they 
explain is small. It is possible that anticipation of other policies, in addition to the NAAQS, 
contributed to the large natural gas capacity increase. During this time period, certain countries 
anticipated implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, the first international agreement to commit 
countries to greenhouse gas emissions reductions to address climate change.69 The Kyoto 
Protocol was adopted by 192 nations in 1997, and took effect in 2005. The US, however, 
dropped out of the international agreement in 2001 and was the only country to sign the Protocol 
without ratifying it.70 Since NGCC has lower emissions of carbon dioxide than other fossil fuel 
technologies, it is possible NGCC growth was also related to anticipation of new greenhouse gas 
emissions reductions resulting from the Kyoto Protocol. Future work with international capacity 
data should also consider the impact of the Kyoto Protocol more specifically, which is controlled 
for in this study using year fixed-effects and not specifically considered. 
Anticipation of renewables policies are not included in this study because renewable 
capacity during the 2001-2003 capacity boom was only 2% of the total new capacity installed, 
and therefore were not as viable an option when choosing which type of fuel to install as it may 
                                                          
69 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. 
70 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, ratification status: 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php 
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be today. State and local policies regarding climate change and greenhouse gases may have also 
played a role in the natural gas capacity boom that are not directly analyzed in this study, but 
also captured by the state and year fixed-effects. These are more likely to have assisted in more 
recent capacity changes (i.e. post- natural gas capacity buildout) since implementation of 
regional and state greenhouse gas emission reductions plans and trading schemes began well 
after the natural gas construction boom,71 or are scheduled to begin in future years.72 Further 
study on natural gas capacity change could include more controls to consider “state greenness,” 
or the proclivity of a state to adopt cleaner generators. These are generally controlled using the 
state fixed-effects, but could be more specifically analyzed. 
The US EPA Clean Power Plan supported increased use of this existing natural gas 
capacity to displace coal generation. In 2015, 56%73 of US natural gas capacity was used to 
produce approximately 30% of total electric generation,74 leaving excess gas-fired capacity 
available to replace coal generation. Lafrancois (2012) calculates that US electricity sector CO2 
emissions could be reduced by as much as 42% if existing NGCC capacity was utilized at a 
higher, but still technically feasible, rate (approximately 75%). Areas that increased natural gas 
capacity earlier are, in most cases, better equipped to decrease coal generation as natural gas 
prices have fallen in recent years. 
As the US considers more aggressive ways of reducing carbon dioxide emissions, 
policymakers are looking to grow other sources of non-coal generation, such as wind and solar 
                                                          
71 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) began greenhouse gas emissions trading in 2008 
(http://www.rggi.org). California’s AB 32 started a greenhouse gas emissions cap-and-trade system in 2012 
(http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm). 
72 EPA’s Clean Power Plan compliance dates are scheduled to start in 2022. 
73 EIA Today, April 4, 2016, “Average utilization for natural gas combined-cycle plants exceeded coal plants in 
2015,” available at:  https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=25652. 
74 EIA Today, March 16, 2016, “Natural gas expected to surpass coal in mix of fuel used for U.S. power generation 
in 2016,” available at: http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=25392. 
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generation. This study may suggest not only the appropriateness of policy in this case, but also 
the effectiveness of past policies on changes in capacity and energy infrastructure investments. 
Additionally, the ability of NGCC to quickly start-up and shut-down compared to other fuel 
sources makes it a good complement to intermittent renewable technology (Neumann & von 
Hirschhausen, 2015). For this reason, increasing capacity of NGCC may also mean an increased 
use of renewables, another strategy outlined in EPA’s Clean Power Plan. Areas that already 
experienced this rapid growth of natural gas capacity may be better able to increase their 
generation from renewable resources, since natural gas generation complements renewable 
generation—particularly while natural gas prices are low (Fell & Kaffine, 2014). 
This study provides more evidence for, and understanding of, the role of uncertainty and 
anticipation of policies in energy investment, pertinent in a regulatory environment with 
changing expectations and regulatory delays. In February 2016, the US Supreme Court stayed 
the EPA’s Clean Power Plan, and in 2017 new EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt initiated a formal 
review of the Clean Power Plan adding more uncertainty as to whether the rule will eventually 
take effect. While a large proportion of states are choosing to continue planning for the eventual 
implementation of the Clean Power Plan, some states have halted their efforts to comply with the 
rule. Since states have individualized carbon emissions targets, it will be interesting to evaluate 
how states’ differing predictions about the Court’s decision and the fate of the review and 
varying levels of preparation affect compliance and carbon abatement. In the world of finance, 
banks are already moving away from financing coal-fired power plants and projects in the US as 
these investments and the future of coal become more risky.75 
                                                          
75 Corkery, M., 2016. As Coal’s Future Grows Murkier, Banks Pull Financing. The New York  
Times (March 21, 2016), A1. 
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The purpose of this study is to begin to look at the role of policy anticipation in 
influencing the pre-shale natural gas capacity boom. This study finds evidence that energy and 
environmental policies, with variations across space and time, led to different construction 
outcomes. As a result, more information is provided on the nature of the areas that invested in 
new natural gas capacity. Investment decisions and policy changes require multiple years of 
planning; considering the role of policy evolution – from anticipation to implementation – adds 
to what is known about investment choices. From changes in nonattainment status, I find that 
anticipation of new environmental policies plays a significant role in shifting or spurring 
capacity growth. Lessons from the natural gas capacity boom thus suggest how expectations 
concerning future environmental regulations can incentivize investment in cleaner energy 
technology. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1: Restructuring coding based on Craig & Savage (2013). 
State 
Access to 
wholesale 
markets Year 
 
State 
Access to 
wholesale 
markets Year 
Alabama No 
 
Montana Yes 2002 
Alaska No 
 
Nebraska Yes 2004 
Arizona No 
 
Nevada No 
Arkansas Yes 2004 
 
New Hampshire Yes 1997 
California Yes 1998 
 
New Jersey Yes 1997 
Colorado No 
 
New Mexico Yes 2004 
Connecticut Yes 1997 
 
New York Yes 1999 
Delaware Yes 1997 
 
North Carolina Yes 2002 
District of 
Columbia Yes 2002 
 
North Dakota Yes 2002 
Florida No 
 
Ohio Yes 2002 
Georgia No 
 
Oklahoma Yes 2004 
Hawaii No 
 
Oregon No 
Idaho No 
 
Pennsylvania Yes 1997 
Illinois Yes 2002 
 
Rhode Island Yes 1997 
Indiana Yes 2002 
 
South Carolina No 
Iowa Yes 2002 
 
South Dakota Yes 2002 
Kansas Yes 2004 
 
Tennessee Yes 1997 
Kentucky Yes 2002 
 
Texas Yes 1997 
Louisiana Yes 2004 
 
Utah No 1997 
Maine Yes 1997 
 
Vermont Yes 1997 
Maryland Yes 1997 
 
Virginia Yes 2002 
Massachusetts Yes 1997 
 
Washington No 
Michigan Yes 2002 
 
West Virginia Yes 2002 
Minnesota Yes 2002 
 
Wisconsin Yes 2002 
Mississippi Yes 2004 
 
Wyoming No 
Missouri Yes 2002 
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Appendix B: Testing Deregulation 
 
In a previous version of this paper, I tested for the impact of anticipating deregulation in 
addition to nonattainment anticipation with several different control variables and models (Table 
B2). This appendix describes how and why earlier models on natural gas capacity growth 
differed and the relevant results. I did not include anticipation of deregulation in the final version 
of this paper because the relationship with natural gas capacity growth was not as theoretically 
well-grounded as that with nonattainment anticipation. Additionally, my results did not show 
much significance regarding the impact of deregulation, in any stage of policy development. The 
previous version of the model used a probit instead of the linear probability model used in the 
final version. I decided to use the LPM in the final model because the probit coefficients were 
more difficult to interpret, and DID models (which I use in the final version of the paper) were 
developed using linear models, not non-linear ones. Additionally, the results were not 
considerably different between the two binary choice models.  
The previous version did not have as many controls, and relied on a time trend instead of a 
year fixed-effect. Additionally, the delineations of new versus expanded capacity (described 
more below) was not very informational. However, the ozone pre-policy period was significant, 
which encouraged me to continue finding a more appropriate model to test the impact of 
nonattainment anticipation.  
I used an OLS model with state fixed-effects ( ) to control for unobserved trends 
particular to the state, such as state industrial and economic activity (equation B1). I also used a 
probit model to focus just on the decision to build natural gas capacity to test if the relationships 
vary from the OLS model. In each model, a time trend ( + )  is included to control for 
other time-varying effects not included in this study. Standard errors are also robust to address 
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heteroskedasticity in the data. Additionally, I test these relationships for new versus expanded 
capacity to see if the relationships change. New plants account for 72% of new natural gas 
capacity during this time period (1996-2009). With information from previous years, I can tell if 
new capacity is the result of a plant expansion or a new plant. Additionally, I ran models with 
California removed as a sensitivity test. I used the same unit of analysis as the present paper 
(electricity “zones”), but a few different controls (Table B1). 
 
=  +  +  + + + + +  (eq. B1) 
 
Table B1: Summary statistics for deregulation regressions. 
Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
ln_ng_cap_change 15,210 0.070 0.584 -5.897 7.795 
ng_build 15,210 0.040 0.197 0 1 
all capacity 16,380 754 1,547 0 19,702 
ng_cap 16,380 240 836 0 12,649 
ln_p 16,366 1.671 0.428 0.263 3.302 
pop_chng 15,536 44 137 -156 1,477 
ng_area 16,380 0.380 0.485 0 1 
dereg_suspended 16,380 0.081 0.273 0 1 
dereg_plan 16,380 0.090 0.287 0 1 
dereg_implemented 16,380 0.219 0.413 0 1 
pre_ozone1997 16,380 0.086 0.280 0 1 
pre_pm1997 16,380 0.044 0.206 0 1 
ozone_NAA 16,380 0.128 0.335 0 1 
pm_NAA 16,380 0.076 0.265 0 1 
      
      
There are two policies of interest, with several stages of development. For deregulation, 
the policy progressed from a pre-policy planning stage. I code this as a dummy variable with the 
value of one for the time when the state adopted deregulation legislation, but before electricity 
markets were operating, and zero otherwise. The deregulation_implementation variable is coded 
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one after the state adopted deregulation adoption and electricity markets were operable. 
Suspension of deregulation is coded as a one when the policy was formally suspended through 
state legislation. For example, California adopted Assembly Bill 1890 in 1996 which signified 
the formal adoption deregulation for that state (Table B3). However, electricity markets and full 
retail access for all customers did not take place until 1998. In 2001, the provisions of AB 1890 
concerning retail access were suspended, and deregulation in California remains “suspended” 
today.  
Table B2: Timing of policies and policy anticipation. 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
EPACT States adopt deregulation
Deregulation
NAA
NAAQS 
changes Ozone PM2.5 
Construction Permitting Online
RTOs set upISOs set up
Construction
 
Table B3: Example of the coding and timeline for California’s deregulation policy variables. 
California Current Status 
Adoption of 
Deregulation 
Full Retail 
Access for All 
Customers Suspension 
Dates Suspended 1996 1998 2001 
Deregulation_plan 1 0 0 
Deregulation_implemented 0 1 0 
Deregulation_suspension 0 0 1 
 
State Henry Hub natural gas prices, which are indexed spot prices per state, are provided 
through EIA for the entirety of the data period. The variable ng_area expresses if natural gas 
capacity existed in the area before the new natural gas capacity went in as a pipeline proxy. With 
the ng_area variable, I can control for the existence of a natural gas capacity, and hence a 
pipeline, in the area before the new natural gas capacity was installed. This controls as a proxy 
for any impacts of expanded pipeline coverage during the time period in this study. This variable 
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is a dummy variable coded as one if natural gas capacity already existed in the zone before the 
new natural gas capacity was installed. All of the variables are described further in Table 3. 
Table B4: Description of variables. 
Code name Description 
Geographic 
Coverage Source Role 
ln_ng_cap_change 
 
 
 
zone 
calculated from 
eGRID 
OLS 
dependent 
variable 
ng_build 
Dummy variable: 1 if built natural gas in that year, 0 if 
did not build natural gas in that year zone 
calculated from 
eGRID 
probit 
dependent 
variable 
ln_p natural log of natural gas price state 
calculated from 
EIA Control 
pop_chng 
 
CBSA 
calculated from 
U.S. Census Control 
 
CBSA 
calculated from 
U.S. Census Control 
ng_area 
Dummy variable: 1 if natural gas capacity existed in 
the area before that year, 0 if otherwise zone 
calculated from 
eGRID Control 
deregulation_suspe
nded 
Dummy variable: 1 if the area was in deregulation 
suspension, 0 if otherwise state 
constructed 
from literature Policy 
Deregulation_plan 
Dummy variable: 1 if the area had passed deregulation 
legislation but did not have operating electricity 
markets, 0 if otherwise state 
constructed 
from literature Policy 
Deregulation_impl
emented 
Dummy variable: 1 if the area had passed deregulation 
legislation and had operating electricity markets state 
constructed 
from literature Policy 
pre_ozone1997 
Dummy variable: 1 if the area was designated 
nonattainment for the 1997 ozone standard but was not 
officially designated yet, 0 if otherwise zone 
calculated from 
EPA Policy 
pre_pm1997 
Dummy variable: 1 if the area was designated 
nonattainment for the 1997 PM standard but was not 
officially designated yet, 0 if otherwise zone 
calculated from 
EPA Policy 
ozone_NAA 
Dummy variable: 1 if the area was designated 
nonattainment for ozone, 0 if otherwise zone 
calculated from 
EPA Policy 
pm_NAA 
Dummy variable: 1 if the area was designated 
nonattainment for PM, 0 if otherwise zone 
calculated from 
EPA Policy 
 
 
Results 
The results from the OLS and probit models show slightly different things about the 
relationships between natural gas capacity growth and the energy and environmental policies and 
( −  )/1000  
( −  )/1000  
ln( ) − ln ( ) 
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energy demand and supply control variables. The full results of the fixed effects model for all 
units of observation (column I), new plants (column II) and expanded plants (column III) for the 
fixed effects (columns I-III) and probit (columns IV-VI) are included in Table B5. The marginal 
effects from the probit are reported in Table B6. 
As expected, as the price of natural gas increases, there is a decrease in natural gas capacity 
growth for the full dataset (all growth, whether from new or expanded plants), which remains 
statistically significant in the new plants fixed effects model. As prices of natural gas increase 
1%, there is a 25% decrease in new natural gas capacity in the full fixed effects model. As 
population increases, there is a statistically significant increase in natural gas capacity growth in 
all models which represents the increased demand for electricity. Further, areas that already had 
natural gas capacity installed in the area had more natural gas capacity growth, and were 4% 
more likely to build any new natural gas capacity, which suggests that the new natural gas 
capacity was not only a result of pipeline infrastructure expansions. 
Turning to the policy variables, suspension of deregulation is the only policy period for 
deregulation with any significant coefficients in both the fixed effects and probit models. When 
moving to deregulation suspension, areas had 25% more new natural gas capacity growth and 
were 5% more likely to build new natural gas capacity according to the marginal effects from the 
probit. However, the deregulation suspension variable loses significance in the fixed effects (full) 
and probit (new) models with sensitivity tests. Deregulation planning stages (time after 
deregulation was adopted but before markets were live) only had a slightly significant 
relationship in the new probit model, showing these areas were 2% more likely to build new 
natural gas plants. There were no significant relationships surviving the sensitivity tests for the 
deregulation implementation stages (when markets were live and before suspension). Following 
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similar arguments to Ford’s study (2002) on policy uncertainty and boom and bust cycles, areas 
that eventually resulted in suspending deregulation may have had more complications in the 
earlier stages of deregulation which may have resulted in a longer pause in building 
commitments. As a result, these areas may have rushed to build more new capacity once 
deregulation was finally suspended, which may explain why these are the only areas with a 
significant coefficient as far as deregulation is concerned in all the results. 
For the nonattainment variables, the pre-ozone 1997 variables experienced a statistically 
significant building boom in the fixed effects and probit models for all models except for the 
fixed effects expanded model. Areas that were eventually designated nonattainment based on the 
1997 ozone standard had a 25% larger natural gas capacity growth than other areas at this time, 
and were 2% more likely to build based on the marginal effects of the probit model. The pre-PM 
variables are only significant in the full dataset probit model and are only 1% more likely to 
build natural gas capacity. This may be because more areas experienced ozone nonattainment 
than PM-nonattainment as PM is a more localized air quality concern. As hypothesized earlier, 
these areas that were eventually designated nonattainment may have expected nonattainment 
designations and stricter building regulations and rushed to build newer, cleaner natural gas 
capacity. 
The only variables with a significant coefficient in nonattainment designation are the PM 
probit model for new plants. While it is unexpected, these areas were 1% more likely to build 
new natural gas after designation, which may be a result of implementation of other state air 
quality efforts to reduce PM pollution.  
Based on these results, it appears the control variables for the price of natural gas, population 
change, and previous natural gas capacity in the area all impact natural gas capacity growth in 
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the directions expected. However, anticipation and implementation of deregulation do not appear 
to play a role in the natural gas capacity boom, but rather there may have been a slight increase 
in capacity after deregulation was suspended. Anticipation of designations tied to new NAAQS 
have a more consistently, statistically significant relationship with natural gas capacity growth. 
Additionally, the marginal effects on the probability of building – while significant – are quite 
small. 
I considered the role of interactions to test if combinations of policies, or different stages of 
different policies were more or less significant than the policy variables provided. These did not 
turn out to be significant and are therefore not included. I also tested different lags of the 
variables but the lagged results were not more robust than what is included here. The consistently 
significant time trend variables, low R-squares, small magnitudes, and small marginal effects 
suggest the policies and control variables in this study only play a minor role in explaining the 
natural gas capacity boom. 
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Table B5: Results from the fixed-effects and probit models. 
FE 
 
Probit 
I. II. III. 
 
IV. V. VI. 
  All New Expand   All New Expand 
ln_p -25.13*** -19.53*** -3.33 -0.271* -0.376** -0.114 
(6.3506) (5.0844) (2.4835) (0.1227) (0.1406) (0.1751) 
pop_chng 0.129*** 0.116*** 0.0301*** 0.000975*** 0.00102*** 0.000560** 
(0.0321) (0.0253) (0.0081) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
ng_area 11.92*** 4.532* 8.119*** 0.613*** 0.294*** 1.182*** 
(2.6080) (2.1469) (1.1802) (0.0540) (0.0619) (0.1000) 
dereg_suspended 25.31** 24.96** 0.882 0.717*** 0.777** 0.322 
(9.1548) (8.1495) (2.5605) (0.2161) (0.2634) (0.2888) 
dereg_plan 8.35 8.251 -1.057 0.307 0.415* 0.0456 
(4.7123) (4.2161) (1.3520) (0.1694) (0.2053) (0.2137) 
dereg_implemented -3.336 1.957 -3.931* -0.0405 0.0239 -0.216 
(4.5872) (3.9908) (1.8334) (0.1774) (0.2072) (0.2289) 
pre_ozone1997 25.06** 19.96** 2.382 0.377*** 0.321** 0.372** 
(9.0154) (7.5991) (2.2414) (0.0877) (0.0993) (0.1285) 
pre_pm1997 24.31 20.13 3.382 0.214* 0.131 0.222 
(14.2327) (11.6295) (3.3438) (0.1061) (0.1215) (0.1406) 
ozone_NAA 4.891 8.032 1.142 0.0524 0.12 0.029 
(5.7298) (4.5810) (2.3705) (0.0862) (0.0888) (0.1383) 
pm_NAA 6.718 6.569 1.427 0.165 0.265** 0.0206 
(6.6145) (6.4205) (2.1227) (0.0858) (0.1000) (0.1177) 
t 17.76*** 14.19*** 3.348*** 0.419*** 0.537*** 0.258*** 
(2.5911) (2.1740) (0.8297) (0.0459) (0.0585) (0.0619) 
t_sq -0.966*** -0.782*** -0.180*** -0.0257*** -0.0333*** -0.0155*** 
(0.1333) (0.1144) (0.0425) (0.0024) (0.0033) (0.0031) 
Constant 0.596 -1.852 -0.981 -3.042*** -3.329*** -3.667*** 
  (15.2964) (14.3032) (5.6932)   (0.2352) (0.3065) (0.2918) 
r2 0.0557 0.0517 0.0382     
N 14,385 14,385 14,385   14,022 13,910 13,469 
State FE X X X  X X X 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
italics indicate p > 0.05 when CA removed 
 
   
 
86 
Table B6: Marginal effects of the probit model. 
dy/dx 
  All New Expand 
ng_area 0.0461*** 0.0148*** 0.0446*** 
dereg_suspended 0.0539** 0.0392** 0.0121 
dereg_plan 0.0231 0.0209* 0.0017 
dereg_implemented -0.0030 0.0012 -0.0082 
pre_ozone1997 0.0283*** 0.0161** 0.0140** 
pre_pm1997 0.0160* 0.0066 0.0084 
ozone_NAA 0.0039 0.0061 0.0011 
pm_NAA 0.0124 0.0134** 0.0008 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
Feasibility of Natural Gas Combined Cycle Utilization Targets: Evidence from 
Environmental Policies and Prices 
 
1. Introduction 
Setting utilization targets to increase generation from natural gas-fired combined cycle 
generators (NGCC) is a regulatory mechanism to decrease greenhouse gas pollutants from the 
US electricity sector. Average utilization of NGCC has been slowly rising (Figure 1) since a new 
crop of NGCC plants were installed from 2000-2005 during what has oftentimes been referred to 
as the natural gas capacity buildout. Traditionally, most of these new NGCC plants supplied 
generation during peak demand, with an overall low utilization rate. While some are slowly 
shifting into a new role as baseload providers, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
through the Clean Power Plan (CPP), is directing that states accelerate that process in order to 
reduce coal generation. 
NGCC units include both a gas turbine and heat recovery steam turbine that reuses the 
waste heat from the gas turbine for high efficiency generation. Due to lower impurities in natural 
gas compared to coal, and high thermal conversion efficiency of NGCC plants,76 NGCC 
generators produce up to 60% less carbon dioxide (CO2), 80-90% lower nitrogen dioxide (NO2), 
and negligible amounts of particulate matter (PM) and sulfur dioxide (SO2).
77  
Due to the environmental advantages of NGCC over coal-fired generation, the CPP 
includes state-level carbon emissions targets based in part on the expectation that states will 
increase output from existing NGCC generators. The CPP sets a target of increasing average 
                                                          
76 Some literature argues the lifecycle methane emissions of unconventional natural gas burned in a NGCC has a 
higher greenhouse gas footprint due to hydraulic fracturing extraction methods for shale gas (Howarth 2014), but 
these findings remain disputable (Allen et al. 2013). EPA and others continue to conduct research to understand the 
impact of upstream methane emissions on the lifecycle CO2 emissions reductions from NGCC. 
77 Nitrogen oxides (NO and NO2) are a precursor to ozone, and both NOx and SO2 are precursors to particulate 
matter (PM). 
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NGCC capacity factors (equation 1) to 75% on a net summer capacity basis, which is similar to a 
70% capacity factor based on nameplate capacity in the original CPP draft rule (August, 2015).  
=  
  
 
=  
   ( )
 ∗  ∗  ( )
           (eq. 1) 
Multiple engineering and economic factors determine how much to run a power plant. 
Different types of system operators typically employ a dispatch process that considers reliability 
and variable costs of power generation to match demand. Technologies with relatively low 
variable costs, such as nuclear power plants, operate at high capacity factors consistently through 
the year (Figure 1). Units with higher variable costs – fossil fuel-fired plants – offer more 
flexibility in when they run to serve load. However, they are still dispatched on the basis of 
variable cost: a natural gas generator will be dispatched ahead of a coal generator when natural 
gas generation is cheaper than coal. Marginal costs of generation primarily depend on fuel prices, 
but can also be influenced by environmental cost of compliance due to air pollution policies. 
Intermittent renewable generation, such as from solar and wind, also have low variable costs and 
operate when meteorological conditions allow them to.  
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Figure 1: Average monthly capacity factor for different fuel-technology generation groups in the 
US. 
Since 2007, tremendous changes in domestic natural gas supply have brought natural gas 
prices to lowest levels in recent history (Figure 2). The CPP recommendation to increase NGCC 
utilization is meant to influence the dispatch order in regions such that NGCC capacity is 
running at 70%, which would primarily displace coal generation by reducing it to one of the less 
frequently dispatched sources of generation, and moving more NGCC plants into the role of 
baseload providers. 
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Figure 2: Nationally averaged, monthly citygate natural gas prices and nationally averaged coal 
prices delivered to the electric power sector per MMBtu, in 2010 dollars, with the coal to natural 
gas price ratio on the right axis. 
 The goal of this research is to identify what impediments to running NGCC at baseload 
level states can address through policy-making, versus the ones they cannot, such as the weather. 
Additionally, this research provides more information on the impact of policies versus fuel prices 
on the heterogeneous increase in NGCC utilization across geographic areas in the last decade. 
These changes in utilization have taken place during a time when dramatic changes in energy 
and environmental regulation, technological innovation, and fuel prices have occurred. Hydraulic 
fracturing and horizontal drilling have supplied the US with an abundance of natural gas 
beginning in 2008, decreasing prices by half to a third of what they were in the early to mid-
2000s. Starting in the late 1990s, states elected to deregulate or restructure their electricity 
markets, changing the regulatory landscape across many parts of the US. Additionally, new 
environmental regulations to reduce criteria pollutants, as well as regional and state programs to 
reduce greenhouse gases, have affected different parts of the country over the last decade.  
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Recent papers on natural gas generation primarily focus on the role of low prices for 
natural gas. These studies from particular regions of the US are finding natural gas-fired 
generators are replacing coal plants as inframarginal providers of electricity as natural gas prices 
have started falling in recent years (Linn, Muehlenbachs, and Wang 2014; Fell and Kaffine 2014; 
Knittel, Metaxoglou, and Trindade 2016). In addition to changes in natural gas prices, I also 
consider the role of energy and environmental policies on natural gas generation which further 
accounts for observed heterogeneous responses in NGCC utilization. I focus specifically on 
utilization of NGCC, which requires distinguishing NGCC generation from other sources of 
natural gas generation. NGCC is the targeted technology to displace coal generation in the CPP 
since it can feasibly increase output to provide baseload power, which other technologies (such 
as single-cycle gas turbines) are not as well suited for.  
I find that in addition to changes in natural gas prices, environmental policies have 
contributed to increases in NGCC utilization in the last decade. However, the combination of low 
natural gas prices and environmental policies still leave NGCC utilization short of the 70% target 
at this time. Other factors, such as energy demand, age of the plant, and fuel mix of the area 
matter as well. This paper aims to provide decision-makers with information to craft state 
policies for increasing natural gas utilization based on empirical evidence of what has already 
taken place, and identifies areas that may have difficulty meeting uniform utilization targets. I 
begin by evaluating the observed shifts in NGCC utilization and previous literature. Next, I 
describe the approach and econometric model used in this study. With the estimated results from 
the random effects model, I compute a counterfactual to compare the relative impact of low 
natural gas prices and environmental policies on CO2 abatement from NGCC utilization thus far, 
finding the environmental policies had a larger impact than low natural gas prices on utilization.  
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2. Observed Shifts and Previous Literature 
 Despite the extraordinary increase in natural gas capacity in the early 2000s, much of this 
new capacity experienced low utilization throughout the 2000s. However, beginning around 
2005 NGCC utilization and natural gas generation started increasing, and in 2016 natural gas 
generation surpassed coal generation for the first time in history on an annual basis.78 
 NGCC plants were initially utilized as peaking units with average capacity factors around 
18%. However, there has been a slow but steady shift to higher capacity factors as seen in the 
kernel density plot in Figure 3. By 2014, the peak in the kernel density plot is centered around 
50% capacity factor, with a much smaller peak at 18%. In the right panel of Figure 3, I compare 
average annual capacity factors for NGCC plants that ran in both 2004 and 2014, finding a shift 
in higher average capacity factors for many NGCC plants. However, it can also be seen that 
several plants have actually reduced capacity factors during this time (those below the 45 degree 
line). Lines for the 70% threshold set by CPP show more plants are at or above this threshold in 
2014 than in 2004, however there are still many below the threshold with room to move to a 
higher capacity factor. On a monthly capacity factor basis, 7% of all NGCC capacity factors 
reached 70% or above in 2003, while 14% were above the target in 2014. 
                                                          
78 EIA Today from April 20, 2017: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=30872. 
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Figure 3: Kernel density plot of NGCC annual capacity factors for different years (left). 
Scatterplot of annual capacity factor for NGCC in 2004 and 2014 for plants running in both 2004 
and 2014 only (right). Gray lines at 0.7 represent the CPP’s NGCC average capacity factor 
target. 
Although average utilization has been increasing, plants in different regions are 
responding in distinctive ways. For example, Figure 4 shows differences in not only initial 
utilization of NGCC plants by region, but also in the timing and amplitude of this shift to higher 
capacity factors for six states. While these states have different amounts of NGCC capacity, they 
share a similar increase in NGCC capacity from 2003-2014. Some states experienced steady 
gains throughout the timeseries (e.g Pennsylvania) while others only began increasing utilization 
after 2008 (e.g. Alabama, Florida). Of the latter group, Alabama had a large increase in 
utilization while Florida’s was more modest. New York experienced a more discontinuous 
increase in NGCC utilization followed by a significant decrease after 2012. Meanwhile, on the 
West Coast there were little to no changes in NGCC utilization. 
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Figure 4: Average annual NGCC capacity factors for six states. 
Recent studies on this shift to increased generation by natural gas power plants focus on 
decreases in natural gas prices relative to coal as reponsible for increases in natural gas 
generation. This would suggest utilization should be increasing across the country, which is not 
the case in Figure 4. Most of these studies focus on particular regions of the US (Kaffine, 
McBee, and Lieskovsky 2013; Novan 2015), or limit themselves to ISO/RTO regions (Fell and 
Kaffine 2014). Or, studies analyze aggregated emissions reductions in particular regions based 
on generation switching (Cullen and Mansur 2014). Recent studies on natural gas generation 
may be limited to evaluating dual-fired plants with the option of internally switching from coal 
to natural gas (Knittel et al. 2015), or focus on decreases of coal generation in response to 
changes in natural gas prices (Fell and Kaffine 2014). Some studies analyze the impact of 
decreased natural gas prices on electricity prices (Linn et al. 2014). These studies confirm the 
intuitive relationship between natural gas generation and natural gas prices; areas with ample 
available natural gas capacity increase generation as a replacement for coal generation as natural 
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gas prices decrease, resulting in decreased CO2 emissions. They also find increases in renewable 
generation may have displaced natural gas generation at first, but is now displacing coal 
generation as natural gas prices have recently fallen during the shale gas revolution (Fell and 
Kaffine 2014). 
This study focuses specifically on capacity factors for NGCC plants as the dependent 
variable, and explicitly considers the role of environmental policies in addition to low natural gas 
prices. It does not include an analysis on the coupled interaction of utilization and capacity 
expansion (Peters and Hertel 2017), another importance source of increases in natural gas 
generation, but focuses on capacity factors alone. This limits the analysis to changes in natural 
gas generation from NGCC plants – the specific technology and mechanism the CPP targets for 
increases in natural gas generation. This study includes all NGCC plants that are not combined 
heat and power plants in the US.79 The present analysis also includes an evaluation of the impact 
of regulatory, plant, and area characteristics on NGCC generation, and implicity assumes 
increases in NGCC generation is replacing coal, established in previous studies (Linn et al. 2014; 
Fell and Kaffine 2014). 
3. Policy Impact on Natural Gas Generation 
 There are several important environmental policy changes that took place during the time 
period that NGCC utilization was increasing. None of the policies explicitly aimed to increase 
NGCC generation; rather all of them are rooted in curbing either conventional or greenhouse gas 
emissions, with a byproduct that resulted in increasing NGCC generation to displace coal 
generation. In this section I describe the three environmental policies of interest, and how they 
contribute to increases in NGCC utilization. 
                                                          
79 Combined heat and power plants do not typically dispatch to the grid, therefore utilization is driven by extremely 
localized energy demand. I do not include them for these reasons since they are not reflective of utilization 
responses for power plants that dispatch to the grid. 
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3.1 Ozone Nonattainment 
The National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) serve as one of the primary 
means for controlling air quality through the use of standards for criteria pollutants to protect 
public health and welfare. Areas with air quality levels that are not meeting the NAAQS are 
designated as nonattainment until they come into compliance with the standards. Firms in 
nonattainment areas are subjected to stricter construction and operation standards in efforts to 
improve air quality to acceptable levels. States or local areas may set policies or programs to 
improve air quality to compliance levels and return to attainment (Frey 2012).  
NAAQS were tightened for ozone, particulate matter (PM), lead, and sulfur dioxide 
(SO2) during the time period of this study. However, the changes in ozone nonattainment had the 
largest spatial impact (Figure 5), and nearly all of the areas designated as nonattainment for PM 
were also nonattainment for ozone as they share important precursor pollutants. As a result, I 
focus on areas that experienced nonattainment for ozone. During the time period covered in this 
study, ozone standards were set in 1997 at effectively 85 ppb, with official nonattainment 
designations promulgated in 2004. These standards were tightened again in 2008 to 75 ppb, with 
designations taking place in 2012.  I expect that firms in areas designated as nonattainment will 
need to shift their generation from coal to natural gas in order to comply with the tightened 
regulations needed to bring the areas back into attainment (since NGCC plants emit significantly 
lower amounts of precursor and criteria pollutants). Operationally, I use ozone nonattainment 
status information from EPA’s Green Book,80 and assign nonattainment values based on 
different NAAQS for ozone. The unit’s nonattainment value is based on the county’s ozone 
nonattainment status for that year. 
                                                          
80 Available at: https://www3.epa.gov/airquality/greenbook/. 
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Figure 5: Map of all initial nonattainment areas for the 1997 and 2008 ozone NAAQS. 
3.2 Cross-State Air Pollution Transport 
In light of new scientific information about the adverse impacts of fine particulates 
associated with SO2, the Bush administration promulgated the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) 
in May of 2005. The main purpose of this rule was to lower the cap on SO2 emissions already 
established in the SO2 allowance market stemming from the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments. 
CAIR would apply specifically to the eastern United States where upwind emissions were 
contributing to downwind nonattainment problems for fine particulate matter. However, shortly 
after promulgation of the rule, EPA announced it would reevaluate the rule, which was 
challenged and eventually vacated in 2008. Despite the vacature, the court allowed CAIR to 
remain in effect until the EPA established a rule that abided with the Clean Air Act 
(Schmalensee and Stavins 2013). In effect, the 2008 vacature confirmed the continuation of the 
SO2 market until EPA was able to replace the rule. CAIR requirements officially began in 2009, 
however the SO2 allowance market experienced a small uptick in allowance prices upon the 
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court decision in 2008 that CAIR would be allowed to continue in the interim before EPA 
designed a new interstate transport rule, which is set to begin in 2017.81 
Since NGCC generation has significantly lower SO2 and NOx emissions than coal 
generation, I code the 28 eastern states where CAIR was in effect beginning in 2008, once CAIR 
was temporarily reinstated by the courts, as my cross-state air pollution transport variable.82 I 
anticipate the cost of compliance with the cross-state rules for coal generators will shift them 
down the economic dispatch order, allowing NGCC generators to run more. 
3.3 Regional/State Greenhouse Gas Programs 
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) was the first operational, multi-state 
greenhouse gas cap-and-trade system to be implemented in the US. It was initiated in 2003, but 
implemented in full with the first auctions for carbon allocations starting in 2009.83 RGGI 
currently includes the states of Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, New 
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.84 RGGI developed a mandatory greenhouse 
gas cap-and-trade program for the electricity sector among states that adopted a core model rule 
crafted by RGGI. Under this program, states auction off a decreasing number of emission 
permits for CO2. The success of RGGI has been mixed, with critics stating that the recession and 
a lenient cap rendered the program ineffective (Legrand 2013). However, a recent study by 
Murray and Maniloff (2015) attributes about half of CO2 emissions reductions during RGGI to 
                                                          
81 In July 2011, EPA issued the Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), which allowed only intrastate trading of 
SO2 and NOx emissions allowances in eastern states of the US. Implementation of this rule faced substantial court 
challenges leading to a delay in CSAPR’s start date until May 2017. During that time, CAIR continued to regulate 
SO2 and NOx emissions in these 28 eastern states.  
82 I also tried using a SO2 intensity variable, coded by multiplying the SO2 allowance price in that year by the SO2 
emissions in the area where the NGCC plant resides. However, this did not prove significant. Additionally, I tested 
starting the cross-state transfer variable in 2009 when CAIR was officially operational, rather than in 2008 when the 
court announced CAIR would be reinstated. A Hausman test reveals the coefficients are not systematically different 
with the 2009 start date versus 2008, therefore I use 2008. 
83 From the RGGI website, available at http://www.rggi.org/ 
84 New Jersey, an original state in RGGI development, left in 2011. 
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the program. Since NGCC CO2 emissions are about 50% lower than the emissions from a 
traditional coal plant, I expect NGCC plant utilization to increase upon implementation of RGGI 
in RGGI states as cost of compliance for coal generators will be higher in these areas. 
California started its own GHG cap-and-trade program, the Air Resources Board (ARB) 
Emissions Trading Program, with the first auction of allowances in 2012 and first compliance 
obligation in January 2013. The ARB Emissions Trading Program covers approximately 450 
entities in California including electricity generators and large industrial facilities, and features a 
declining emissions cap each year.85 I include California’s program in the “regional program” 
variable which turns on in 2013 for units in California. 
The time line for these three policy variables is indicated by the percent of NGCC units 
affected by each policy in Table 1. 
Table 1: Percent of NGCC units affected by policies. 
 
3.4 Age of the Plants Affected by Policies 
Most of the new NGCC capacity was built during the natural gas capacity buildout from 
2000-2005 (59%), with another significant portion constructed after the buildout (23%). Plants 
built during or after the buildout represent a new generation of the technology and are 
significantly cleaner, more efficient, and more reliable than earlier plants (Curtis 2003). 
Therefore, environmental policies aiming to reduce air emissions may decrease use of older 
                                                          
85 Information on the ARB Emissions Trading program is from the California Air Resources Board website: 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/cap_trade_overview.pdf. 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Ozone 1997 21 24 25 29 26 24 25 25 25 31 32
2008 26 27 27
Cross-State CAIR 65 64 65 66 66 64 64
Regional Program RGGI 13 12 11 11 11 11
CA 13 13
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NGCC units (i.e. built before 2000) that are not as clean or efficient as the newer NGCC plants.  
I will account for this separately in the model, discussed in section 4.2.2. 
4. Analysis 
4.1 Data 
The dataset was built from multiple EIA forms on the electric power sector, seen in Table 
2. To determine which plants are in the electric power sector, I use a compilation of EPA’s 
Emissions and Generation Resource Integrated Database (eGRID)86 from 2003-2012. For 2013 
and 2014, I keep plants that are in the electric sector based on EIA form-860 value 
“SectorName.” I remove plants that are combined heat and power plants since they typically do 
not dispatch to the grid, and remove observations that are missing capacity or generation data, or 
have unrealistic capacity factors, which are less than 1% of the data.  
Table 2: EIA forms used to construct this dataset. 
Years Generation Plant Characteristics 
2003-2006 906, 920 860 
2007 906, 920, 923 860 
2008-2014 923 860 
 
Using the dataset, I create units based on plant-fuel-technology group. This combines 
multiple emissions units of the same fuel and technology type from the same plant into one unit 
to match the way EIA generation data is provided. The technology groups are described in Table 
3. The only individual generation unit information this compromises is the year the generator 
came online and its size. For the age of the unit, I calculate a capacity-weighted average age for 
each observation. The size is the mean nameplate capacity of the generating units at each NGCC 
                                                          
86 More information and data available at: https://www.epa.gov/energy/egrid. 
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plant.87 The extraction process and combining of datasets yields significantly comparable 
capacity totals to EIA and eGRID summary tables. 
Table 3: Fuel and technology codes for creating plant-fuel-technology groups in this study. 
 
Group Abbreviation Fuel Technology EIA fuel codes EIA technology codes 
Combined Cycle NGCC natural gas combined cycle NG CC, CA, CT, CS 
Gas Turbine GT natural gas gas turbines NG GT 
Coal-Steam coal_steam coal steam turbine BIT, LIG, ANT, SUB, WC ST 
Nuclear nuke uranium steam turbine NUC ST 
Oil oil oil any  JF, KER, DFO, RFO Any 
Dispatchable 
Renewable d_renew 
water, geothermal, 
municipal waste, 
landfill gas, waste any 
WAT, GST, WDL, GEO, 
LFG, MSW, OBG, WDS Any 
Intermittent 
Renewable i_renew sun, wind any SUN, WND Any 
Natural gas other ng_other natural gas 
any besides 
combined cycle or 
gas turbine NG any besides CC or GT 
Other other 
any not already 
categorized 
any not already 
categorized any not already categorized 
any not already 
categorized 
 
 The EIA forms provide locational information on each plant. Figure 6 displays all the 
units in my time series, based on their nameplate capacity in 2014, and color coded by fuel-
technology type.  
 
Figure 6: All units in the dataset, sized by nameplate capacity in 2014 (MW), and color-coded by 
fuel-technology type. 
                                                          
87  =  (      ⁄ ) 
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4.2 Control Variables 
4.2.1 Natural Gas Prices 
As discussed earlier, I include the ratio of coal to natural gas prices at the month-state 
level. I divide the state citygate price of natural gas by the state average coal price delivered to 
the electric power sector provided through EIA (in MMBtu, in 2010 dollars).  
4.2.2 Plant Characteristics 
Using the EIA form-860 data, I use the mean size of the NGCC generators in each unit to 
calculate the mean capacity. To determine mean capacity, I divide the plant’s NGCC capacity by 
the number of NGCC generating units at the plant. I anticipate age to be an important factor in 
determining which plants are more likely to experience changes in capacity factors based on 
previous literature (Fell and Kaffine 2014). I calculate age as the capacity weighted age of the 
generators in the NGCC unit in 2014. For each of the policies, I also include an ∗  
interaction variable to account for the different impacts the policy may have had on old versus 
newer generators for each of the three policies described above. 
Both the operational and ownership control of power plants can vary, and may impact 
dispatching. At the ownership level, there are utilities, primarily made up of investor-owned 
utilities (IOU), and independent power producers (IPP). A utility transmits and distributes 
electricity and is classified as “regulated” in EIA form-860. An IPP is a non-utility power plant 
that sells power into the grid without transmitting or distributing it, and is classified as “non-
regulated.” In 2014, regulated utilities produced 63% of generation while owning 61% of all 
nameplate capacity in the electricity sector. The EPA estimates that all ownership and 
operational structures will be able to respond to NGCC capacity factor targets in the CPP.  
Additionally, these power plants either operate in a traditional market in areas that did not 
elect to restructure following deregulation in the 1990s, or in a deregulated wholesale market. In 
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a traditional market, dispatch is typically operated by vertically-integrated utilities that also 
operate transmission and distribution systems. The wholesale markets, where they exist, are 
coordinated by Independent System Operators (ISOs) and Regional Transmission Organizations 
(RTOs), referred to as ISO/RTOs in this study, which operate a market to determine which 
owners will dispatch to meet load on the local grid. About 60% of plants in the electric sector 
participate in an ISO/RTO. According to the CPP, any of the different types of ownership and 
dispatch control combinations will be able to meet the NGCC utilization target by different 
mechanisms. However, I still control for these unit characteristics in case the relationships differ 
at all. 
4.2.3 Weather 
Natural gas supply constraints may also cause changes in natural gas generation. Natural 
gas generation experiences two seasonal peaks. The first peak is during wintertime heating to 
meet increased energy demand, and the second is during summertime to meet cooling energy 
demand. The summertime peak is the larger of the two (Figure 1). Additionally, natural gas is 
used for residential and commercial heating which reduces the availability of natural gas for 
power generation in the wintertime. For these reasons, I include heating degree days (HDD) and 
cooling degree days (CDD) from the National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration’s Climate 
Prediction Center.88  
4.2.4 Area characteristics  
I also include several variables that control for the characteristics and load of the 
transmission grid the NGCC plants are a part of. I determine the plants included in this “area” 
                                                          
88 These datasets do not include variables for Alaska and Hawaii, and since they are very small amounts of the total 
electric power sector, I drop all power plants from Alaska and Hawaii from my database. Plants in these states also 
face different natural resource constraints and are likely to behave differently than power plants in the contiguous 
US. There are no NGCC generators in Hawaii, and the 4 in Alaska represent less than 0.3% of all NGCC capacity in 
the US. 
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based on a shared transmission or distribution system owner, provided by the EIA-860 data. 
Based on the full set of generators in the electricity sector (i.e. not exclusively NGCC plants), I 
have 854 areas of approximately 1.5 GW of capacity. Of these, 143 areas contain at least one 
NGCC unit. To control for the demand in the area, I divide the monthly demand by the 
maximum demand of the area in the time series.  
I also include variables that control for the percentage of nameplate capacity in each area 
provided by coal power plants, and nuclear power plants, separately. Further, I include the 
percentage of generation provided by intermittent renewable generation in each area as well. 
Capacity provides a sufficient control for coal because it is the primary competition for NGCC 
generation, and inclusion of coal generation would account for a large portion of the variation in 
NGCC generation without determining the effects of what contributed to the decision to switch 
from coal to NGCC. Nuclear power plants and intermittent renewable units (defined as solar and 
wind in this study) have relatively low variable costs, and therefore run at maximum output 
while they can. Nuclear plants operate near maximum output most of the time resulting in high 
capacity factors; therefore I use percentage of nuclear capacity as a control. Intermittent 
renewables, however, run at a high output while their resources are available but at much lower 
rates during other times, resulting in lower average capacity factors. For this reason, I use 
intermittent renewable generation rather than capacity as the control for intermittent renewable 
power.  
4.2.5 Policy Controls 
The model includes several state difference-in-difference dummies for the cross-state and 
regional program policies. These difference-in-difference dummies are an extra check that the 
measured policy effect is truly due to the policy, and not attributable to omitted factors related to 
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the areas where the policy was applied or the time period the policy took place in. The variables 
Treat Cross-State and Treat Regional Program are time invariant dummies for the states where 
the policies took place. The dummy Post Cross-State/RGGI captures the time period for the 
cross-state air pollution rules and the RGGI portion of the regional program variable since they 
are roughly during the same time period (e.g. 2008-2014). Since RGGI actually begins in 2009, I 
do not use a Post*Treatment interaction variable for my policy variables as would be the case in 
a classical difference-in-difference model. Instead, the Cross-State policy variable turns on when 
the policy is in effect (e.g. 2008-2014) in the states that it is in effect, and the same is true for the 
Regional Program variables (e.g. California from 2013-2014, and RGGI states from 2009-2014).  
Since ozone nonattainment occurs in smaller areas at different time spans, I do not use 
difference-in-difference controls for this policy. 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of the 368 NGCC plants in my dataset are provided in Table 4. 
The dataset consists of monthly capacity factors from 2003-2014 for these plants. Of these 
NGCC plants, 16 plants retire, while 218 plants began operation during this time period. Of these 
new plants, 79 were built at the end of the natural gas capacity buildout included in this time 
series (2003-2005). The average time spent in the series is 7.3 years, and approximately 70% of 
the plants are in the dataset for 5 years or more.  
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics. 
  Unit Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable: 
     CF 
 
35,397 0.337 0.258 0 0.999 
Price: 
     Price ratio (coal/ng) 
 
35,397 0.410 0.251 0 2 
Policy: 
     Ozone NAA 
 
35,397 0.286 0.452 0 1 
    Regional Program 
 
35,397 0.101 0.302 0 1 
    Cross-State 
 
35,397 0.432 0.495 0 1 
Policy controls: 
     Post Cross-State/RGGI 
 
35,397 0.663 0.473 0 1 
    Treat Cross-State 
 
35,397 0.654 0.476 0 1 
    Treat Regional Program 
 
35,397 0.242 0.428 0 1 
Age*Policy Interaction: 
     Age*Ozone NAA years 35,397 4.142 7.965 0 47 
    Age*Regional Program years 35,397 1.394 4.706 0 39 
    Age*Cross-State years 35,397 6.564 9.818 0 55 
Unit characteristics: 
    Nameplate MW 35,397 676 482 11 4,263 
    Generator Count 35,397 4 2 1 12 
    Mean Capacity MW 35,397 168 74 4 410 
    Mean Capacity2 MW2 35,397 33,782 23,173 13 167,690 
    Age years 35,397 15 9 0 72 
    ISO/RTO 35,397 1 0 0 1 
    Regulated 35,397 0.482 0.500 0 1 
Weather: 
    HDD degree days/1,000 35,397 305 361 0 1,886 
    CDD degree days/1,000 35,397 141 182 0 782 
Area characteristics: 
    Load  percent 35,397 0.633 0.213 0 1 
    Coal capacity percent 35,397 0.199 0.206 0 0.88 
    Nuclear capacity percent 35,397 0.072 0.115 0 0.72 
    Renewable generation percent 35,397 0.035 0.091 0 1 
4.4 Random-Effects Model 
 I begin by using a random effects (RE) model to evaluate the impact of price ( ), policies 
( ), plant characteristics ( ), weather ( ), and area load ( ) on NGCC plant capacity factors 
from 2003-2014, seen in equation 2. The RE model includes a composite error term ( +  ) to 
address unobserved effects particular to each plant, assuming the unobservables are not 
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correlated with the explanatory variables. Under this assumption, an RE model can include 
variables that are constant over time, such as the mean generator size or age of the plant, unlike a 
fixed-effect (FE) model which includes a time invariant variable to capture the unobserved 
effects at each plant through the time series. Additionally, an RE model uses the generalized 
least squares transformation to eliminate serial correlation in the adjusted error term (Wooldridge 
2000). Since the model in this study has ample controls, it is unlikely that the unobservable are 
correlated with the explanatory variables. The model passes a Hausman test finding no 
systematic difference in the coefficients between the FE and RE model, which indicates the RE 
assumption holds. The RE is preferred and used in this study in order to include the time 
invariant variables in the model and for more efficient estimation. The results of the RE and FE 
model (II vs. IV in Table 5) shows little difference in the coefficients of interest. 
=  +   + +   +     
+   /  +   +     
+ ( ∙ ) + + + + ℎ +  
+ ( + )        (eq. 2) 
=     
=  ( ℎ)  
=   
=   
=  ℎ   
= ℎ   
=  ℎ  
( + ∈) =     
 
The RE model also includes seasonality and region fixed-effects ( ℎ, ), as 
well as robust, clustered standard errors at the area level to address potential heteroskedasticity 
and errors that may be correlated within an area. In addition to the original RE model (I), I 
include several additional models to control for time trends that may be due to advances in 
 
111 
technology or learning by doing. Model (II) includes a year FE, while model (III) includes a 
∗ ℎ fixed-effect. 
5. Estimation Results 
 The four models have similar coefficients on the policy variables of interest, but inclusion 
of the year and ∗ ℎ fixed-effects impacts the statistical significance and size of the 
coefficient for the resource price ratio. The variation in the resource prices over time is absorbed 
by the time fixed-effect, which has led other researchers focusing on resource prices to avoid 
using it as well (Knittel et al. 2016). However, I include these versions of the model to show the 
consistency of other variables of interest, including the cross-state policy, ∗  
interaction, mean capacity, weather variables, area load, area coal capacity, and area intermittent 
renewable generation. I focus my analysis on interpretation on model (I), but discuss the 
deviations from this model in the other versions of the model as appropriate.  
5.1 Policy Effects 
The only policy variable with strong statistical significance in all of the models is the 
cross-state rule representing the CAIR regulations. Both the cross-state policy variable and 
∗  variables are significant at the 99.9% confidence level. The coefficient on the 
cross-state policy variable is positive, while the cross-state ∗  interaction variable is 
negative. This indicates that a brand new plant under the cross-state rule has higher capacity 
factor of 0.156, on average. However, for each additional year in a plant’s age, the overall impact 
to the capacity factor decreases by 0.0044, the coefficient for ∗ . To calculate 
the overall policy impact for each policy (x) for every observation (i) where the policy takes 
place, I use the coefficients for both the policy variable ( ) and the ∗  interaction 
variable ( ) as seen in equation 3. Given the average age of the plants affected by the cross-
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state rule (Table 6), the average impact of the cross-state policy was an increase in capacity 
factor by 0.09. With an average capacity factor of 0.33, this leads to a 27% increase in the 
capacity factor for units impacted by the cross-state rule.  
 = ( + ∗ ) ∗      (eq. 3) 
Since coal has much higher SO2 and NOx emissions, NGCC utilization increased to make 
up for decreases in coal generation encouraged by the cross-state air pollution transport policy. 
Since I control for the natural gas to coal price ratio, this uptick in utilization is beyond the 
increases caused by decreases in natural gas prices at this time. However, NGCC units older than 
35 years of age decreased utilization under the cross-state air pollution transport rules using 
equation 3. While the coefficient with the year (II) and ∗ ℎ fixed-effect (III) decreases 
in magnitude slightly, the two policy coefficients associated with the cross-state policy remain at 
99.9% statistical significance. 
The coefficient on ozone nonattainment is positive, and ∗  interaction is also 
negative, but neither of these coefficients is statistically significant. NGCC plants that are in a 
regional and state greenhouse gas program and brand new have a higher capacity factor by 
0.0547, significant at the 96.2% significance level. The interaction with age is negative but not 
statistically significant, which is likely because these areas have fewer, older NGCC units. This 
complements the findings from Murray and Maniloff (2015) that RGGI had an impact on 
decreasing CO2 emissions beyond changes in natural gas prices and the economic recession. Part 
of the emissions decreases may be due to increased generation by NGCC, supporting the CPP’s 
recommendation that states could embark on regional greenhouse gas cap-and-trade programs, 
like RGGI, to reach their carbon emission targets by increasing NGCC utilization. However, 
causality is not determined since the policy variable is only weakly significant. It is possible that 
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as these programs continue, a more significant policy effect can be measured with additional 
observations, as only 10% of the observations in this data are included in a regional program. 
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Table 5: Results of models with standard errors clustered by the transmission area. 
 
 
(I)  RE (II) RE (III) RE (IV) FE  
  Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE 
Price: 
    Price ratio (coal/ng) 0.110** 0.0349 0.0656+ 0.0343 0.0447 0.0363 0.0628+ 0.0344 
Policy: 
    Ozone NAA 0.0289 0.0261 0.00987 0.0266 0.00977 0.0268 -0.00251 0.0284 
    Regional Program 0.0547* 0.0263 0.0461+ 0.0259 0.0446+ 0.0259 0.0441 0.0278 
    CrossState 0.156*** 0.0283 0.149*** 0.027 0.147*** 0.0271 0.150*** 0.0277 
Policy controls: 
    Post Cross-State/RGGI -0.0413** 0.0145 -0.0228 0.0224 -0.00824 0.0208 -0.0421* 0.0189 
    Treat CrossState -0.0619 0.0503 -0.0568 0.0519 -0.0579 0.0517 
    Treat Regional Program -0.0592 0.0451 -0.0319 0.0438 -0.0215 0.0441 
Age*Policy Interaction: 
    Age*Ozone NAA -0.00185 0.0013 -0.00158 0.0014 -0.00164 0.0014 -0.000809 0.0014 
    Age*Regional Program -0.00173 0.0014 -0.00168 0.0014 -0.00168 0.0014 -0.00152 0.0014 
    Age*CrossState -0.00441*** 0.001 -0.00434*** 0.001 -0.00434*** 0.0009 -0.00450*** 0.001 
Unit characteristics: 
    Mean Capacity 0.00134* 0.0006 0.00131* 0.0006 0.00132* 0.0006 
    Mean Capacity2 -2.0E-6 1.5E-6 -1.9E-6 1.4E-6 -1.92E-6 1.5E-6 
    Age 3.51E-5 0.0014 3.21E-6 0.0014 -6.08E-6 0.0014 
    ISO/RTO 0.0245 0.0356 0.0216 0.0354 0.0189 0.0355 
    Regulated 0.00903 0.0207 0.00436 0.0214 0.00353 0.0215 
Weather: 
    HDD -0.0961*** 0.0183 -0.0906*** 0.018 -0.0967*** 0.0202 -0.0925*** 0.0185 
    CDD 0.282*** 0.0419 0.289*** 0.0428 0.304*** 0.0462 0.292*** 0.0436 
Area characteristics: 
    Load  0.438*** 0.0445 0.430*** 0.0454 0.422*** 0.046 0.432*** 0.0462 
    Coal capacity -0.277** 0.0996 -0.276** 0.1014 -0.271** 0.1028 -0.265+ 0.1519 
    Nuclear capacity -0.238* 0.1169 -0.231+ 0.1201 -0.228+ 0.1206 -0.0954 0.2345 
    Renewable generation -0.311*** 0.0614 -0.334*** 0.0648 -0.333*** 0.0652 -0.334*** 0.068 
Constant -0.119 0.1022 -0.101 0.1022 -0.0814 0.1085 0.043 0.0731 
N 35,397 35,397 35,397 35,397 
R-sq (Overall) 0.337   0.332   0.334   0.279   
Month FE X X X X 
Year FE 
  
X 
   
X 
 Month*Year FE X 
Region FE X   X   X   X   
Standard errors in parentheses 
       + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
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Table 6: Average policy effect using coefficients from the policy and ∗  variables. 
 
Coefficient 
  Policy Policy*Age Avg. Age 
Avg. 
Effect 
Ozone NAA 0.0289 -0.00185 14.5 0.002 
Regional Program 0.0547* -0.00173 13.7 0.031 
Cross State 0.156*** -0.00441*** 15.2 0.089 
    + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 Figure 7 provides a visual interpretation of the coefficients from the policy variables with 
95% confidence intervals to convey uncertainty in the estimates. The 95% confidence intervals 
are calculated as a function of the policy coefficients (eq. 3). The figure shows the impact of the 
cross-state rule declines in older plants, as older technology may not be as economically 
advantageous to run under new environmental regulations. However for ozone, the impact for a 
brand new plant is very close to zero with a larger confidence interval, indicating low statistical 
significance. The regional program policy coefficient’s confidence intervals remain above zero 
out to 10 years, the median aged plant.  
 In most cases, the policy control variables (i.e. post and treatment variables) are not 
significant. However, in model (I), the Post Cross-State/RGGI variable is significant at the 
99.6% level, and negative with a relatively small coefficient. This indicates that plants outside of 
the cross-state and regional programs experienced a small decrease in capacity factors while 
these policies took place.  
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Figure 7: The average impact of each policy on NGCC capacity factors (ranges from 0 to 1), 
based on the age of the plant. The dotted lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals, and the 
solid line is the average effect. 
 
5.2 Other Explanatory Factors 
As expected, NGCC utilization increases as natural gas prices decrease in model (I), a 
well-supported hypothesis in previous literature (Linn et al. 2014; Fell and Kaffine 2014; Cullen 
and Mansur 2014). However, the statistical significance decreases from 99.8% significance in 
model (I), to 94.4% significance with a year FE, and out of statistical significance with the 
∗ ℎ FE in model (III), which is to be expected since resource prices vary with time.  
In addition to the policies and resource prices, the physical characteristics of the plants 
may have contributed to differences in utilization of NGCC. The mean capacity is weakly 
statistically significant, but the quadratic term falls out of statistical significance. The capacity 
weighted age variable is not significant because much of the age variation has been absorbed by 
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multiple ∗  interactions. As conjectured in the CPP, the regulatory ownership and 
membership in an ISO/RTO do not have a statistically significant impact on NGCC utilization, 
suggesting that neither ownership nor market type is significantly underperforming in NGCC 
utilization. 
 The heating and cooling degree day coefficients are both strongly significant at the 99.9% 
level in all of the models. Increases in heating degree days decrease NGCC capacity factors, 
confirming that residential and commercial heating competes with natural gas available for 
NGCC generation. The coefficient on cooling degree days is positive, showing that increased 
demand required for air conditioning increases NGCC capacity factors, even after removing the 
seasonality fixed-effect. This would mean particularly hot summers experience the highest 
NGCC capacity factors. 
 The EPA Clean Power Plan lays out the framework for when the NGCC utilization target 
should be met based on historical changes in NGCC utilization. From 2011 to 2012, the largest 
increase in natural gas generation (22%) took place. Based on the magnitude of this one-year 
jump, the EPA estimates that the electric power sector can reach an average 22% increase in 
natural gas generation by 2022, with a 5% increase thereafter until 2030. This would result in 
natural gas generation achieving 70% capacity utilization in 2030. The EPA argues that this is a 
reasonable target because the sector has already demonstrated its ability to (temporarily) increase 
utilization, and necessary infrastructure changes can be made in the interim to make additional 
increases possible. As it turns out, 2012 was an exceptionally warm winter followed by an 
anomalously hot summer (Figure 8). The warmer winter led to a decreased demand of natural 
gas for heating, resulting in an increase in supply and storage of natural gas before a hot summer 
with high energy demand. These two factors, combined with the anomalously cold winter in 
2011, contributed to this 2011-2012 increase in natural gas generation. Since the EPA used the 
2011-2012 increase as the basis for determining future utilization targets in each area, this 
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suggests this target may be more difficult to reach when winter and summertime temperatures 
are not anomalously warm. This occurred in 2013, and NGCC generation levels were lower than 
in 2012.   
 
Figure 8: Average heating (HDD) and cooling (CDD) degree days for contiguous US for July 
(CDD) and January (HDD), with dashed line indicating CPP reference year 2012. 
 The characteristics of the load in each area are mostly significant in each version of the 
model. As energy demand in each area increases (Load), the NGCC capacity factors increase, 
which is strongly significant in each model. As coal and nuclear capacity in an area decreases, 
NGCC utilization increases in most models, but varies from weak to medium significance. The 
coefficient on renewables generation is consistently 99.9% significant, and indicates that as 
renewable generation increases, NGCC utilization decreases. Studies focusing on 
complementary and substitution effects of intermittent renewable generation on natural gas 
generation have found intermittent renewables displaced natural gas generation in studies with a 
dataset from 2000-2010 (Kaffine et al. 2013; Cullen and Mansur 2014). More recent papers 
evaluating changes from 2008-2013 as renewables became more prominent and natural gas 
prices decreased find a complementary effect (Fell and Kaffine 2014). Therefore, it is possible 
this coefficient is negative because it is more heavily influenced by the earlier portion of the time 
series. This could also show that as intermittent renewable generation increases, which ultimately 
drives CO2 emissions down even further, NGCC will phase out. This requires further 
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investigation outside of the scope of this paper to determine what is causing this negative 
coefficient. 
5.3 Counterfactual Calculation 
 I use the RE model (I) coefficients to run a counterfactual calculation to estimate the 
effect of the policies, natural gas prices, and carbon taxes on natural gas generation and CO2 
emissions. The baseline scenario uses the model’s predicted capacity factors with no changes to 
the policies or natural gas prices. The alternative scenarios presume the policies never occurred 
or that natural gas prices remained at 2007 levels. Additional alternative scenarios presume a 
social cost of carbon priced at $36/ton is applied to the natural gas and coal prices, or a policy 
equivalent tax is applied (found to be at $55/ton) in place of the policies. I use the predicted 
capacity factors and capacity data to calculate differences in natural gas generation from 
baseline.  
Table 7: Counterfactual calculation scenarios. 
Scenario Price and Policy Settings 
1. Baseline Actual data 
2. Without policies Policies and age*policy set to zero 
3. Historical NG prices 2007 NG prices fixed 
4. Social cost of carbon tax Policies and interactions set to zero and SCC added to fuel costs 
5. Policy equivalent tax Policies and interactions set to zero and tax added to fuel costs 
 
In order to apply a carbon price in the SCC and tax scenarios, I use the most recent EIA 
carbon intensity numbers89 and multiply these respective values by the tax to get the appropriate 
values to add to the natural gas and coal prices in MMBtu. Figure 9 displays the total difference 
over the time period for each scenario in terms of percent of total NGCC generation with 95% 
confidence intervals.  
 
                                                          
89 August 17, 2016 EIA’s Today in Energy carbon intensity values of 95 
  
 
for coal, and 52 
  
 
for 
natural gas, converted to 
 
 
 provided at: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=27552. 
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Figure 9: The percent of NGCC generation that occurred due to increased utilization over the 
time period 2003-2014 by the different components. 
The total impact of the cross-state rule (13%) is approximately 2.6 times larger than the 
impact of the natural gas price decrease (5%) on combined cycle utilization. The total impact of 
the policies (14%) is only slightly higher than the cross-state rule, but the confidence interval is 
rather large due to the uncertainty associated with the coefficients on ozone and regional 
program. The cross-state rule had the same impact on increasing NGCC generation as a $55/ton 
carbon tax issued from the beginning of the time series. Since the bulk of the policies and natural 
gas price decreases did not occur until midway through the time period, the percent contributions 
to aggregate generation seems small. However, in a single year with both the policies and the 
low natural gas prices, the relative contributions are much larger, and may even be closer 
between the policies and price decreases. The difference between actual generation and model 
predicted values (baseline) is less than 1%. 
Using this information about the difference in NGCC generation from each scenario, I 
calculated the amount of CO2 emissions averted assuming the increased NGCC generation 
replaced coal. I use the carbon intensity coefficients provided by EIA to calculate the million 
tons CO2 averted per month by the decrease in natural gas prices beginning in 2007, versus the 
policies (Figure 10). Over the total time series, this is 371 million tons of CO2 due to the policies, 
341 million tons due to cross-state alone, and 142 million tons due to the decrease in natural gas 
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prices since 2007. In 2014, the decrease in CO2 emissions due to the cross-state rule and low 
natural gas prices was approximately 4% of all electric sector CO2 emissions, with 3% of that 
due to the cross-state rule and 1% due to the lower natural gas prices. Cullen and Mansur (2014) 
estimate a $60 ton CO2 price would decrease CO2 emissions by approximately 9%. Since the 
cross-state policy equals the impact of a $55 tax, my value is smaller primarily because it 
represents the emissions decrease due to increased utilization of existing NGCC plants, and not 
due to additional generation from new NGCC capacity related to a tax, or other natural gas-fired 
plants.  
 
Figure 10: CO2 emissions averted by increased NGCC generation from the policies and natural 
gas price decrease (since 2007) components per month. 
6. Conclusion 
 This study focuses on the changes in NGCC capacity factors that have already taken 
place from 2003-2014 in order to shed light on the new utilization targets to decrease US carbon 
emissions from the electricity sector in EPA’s Clean Power Plan. While most recent studies on 
natural gas generation focus on the role of natural gas prices and renewable generation, this study 
also considers the role of energy and environmental policies to produce a counterfactual analysis 
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determining the relative contribution of decreases in natural gas prices versus several 
environmental policies on increases in NGCC utilization.  
The findings show the cross-state air pollution transport policy, or CAIR reinstated, 
significantly contributed to increases in NGCC utilization. It effectively lowered the cap on SO2 
and NOx emissions in upwind states contributing to nonattainment in the mid-west and northeast, 
rendering coal generation more costly. However, the impact of the policy declines with the age 
of the plant. This indicates a substantial co-benefit from a criteria pollutant policy in 
incentivizing increased NGCC utilization, which in turn reduces carbon dioxide emissions.  
Variables representing NAAQS nonattainment status or regional programs are not 
strongly significant, in terms of impact and statistics. However there were also fewer 
observations in this study affected by these policies compared to the cross-state rule. Therefore, 
this finding does not prove that these policies did not contribute to increases in NGCC 
utilization, and more research should be done in this area. Since the Clean Air Act requires that 
the NAAQS be reviewed every 5 years, they will remain an important piece of the regulatory 
framework during implementation of the Clean Power Plan (or any greenhouse gas reduction 
program). Decreased natural gas prices since 2008 due to increased extraction of unconventional 
domestic natural gas has also led to increased NGCC generation. However, the combined effect 
of the policies on natural gas generation is typically 2.6 times as high as the decreases on natural 
gas prices, thus averting nearly three times as much CO2 emissions as low natural gas prices over 
the cumulative 2003-2014 time period. However, there are individual years and months when 
natural gas prices were particularly low, resulting in a more equivalent impact by the policies and 
prices. 
Despite the increases in NGCC utilization, few plants have run at high capacity factors 
even with low natural gas prices and environmental policies that favor gas over coal. The fuel 
mix of each area, and the age and size of the generators are also important. This suggests that 
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while policy can certainly nudge NGCC utilization, these other factors must also be considered 
when evaluating the efforts of areas to reach their NGCC utilization targets. This study shows 
NGCC capacity factors will decrease for older generators faced with more costly compliance 
requirements. Since the CPP emissions targets are calculated on the basis that existing NGCC 
capacity will be run at 70%, this means it would be quite costly for older NGCC plants to meet 
the same 70% target since they have higher emissions than the newer technology. Or, areas may 
need to install new NGCC units or make substantial modifications to their old units to reach their 
emissions targets. Figure 11 identifies the areas of the country with older NGCC generators that 
may particularly struggle to increase utilization. Some of the states with older NGCC generators, 
such as Oklahoma, Iowa, and Texas may need to lean more heavily on the other building blocks 
of the CPP to reduce carbon emissions. 
 
Figure 11: Average capacity weighted age of NGCC plants, per state. 
Finally, the results raise another important cautionary note for the CPP: capacity factors 
increase most in years with anomalously warm winters and hot summers. This situation leads to 
more natural gas storage in the winter, followed by increased energy demand in the summer. The 
base year used by the EPA in setting state targets, 2012, was unusual in exactly that respect: it 
had an exceptionally warm winter followed by an anomalously hot summer. The CPP may thus 
overstate the rate at which capacity factors are likely to increase with lower storage or less 
energy demand in the summer. 
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 While the EPA’s Clean Power Plan is currently stayed by a Supreme Court decision in 
February 2016, NGCC generation will remain an important aspect of the energy sector for the 
foreseeable future. As the domestic natural gas glut continues, and environmental standards 
perhaps tighten, areas are likely to continue the trend towards replacing coal-fired and aging 
nuclear plants with available NGCC generation. This study illustrates how demonstrated policies 
can be applied or enhanced to increase natural gas utilization from existing NGCC plants, but 
cautions against uniform utilization targets that may be costly for particular plants to achieve. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
Conclusion 
 The essays comprising this dissertation evaluate aspects of three important developments 
for natural gas-fired combined cycle generators in the US over the last thirty years: (1) efficiency 
increases from technological change in the 1990s, (2) rapid capacity growth in the early 2000s, 
and (3) increased utilization from 2003-2014. After a review of the findings, policy implications, 
and areas for future research, I consider how the lessons learned from this research will affect 
NGCC in the future. 
1. Findings 
 Chapter 2 uses patent data to evaluate the impact of a US public-private partnership 
between DOE and NGCC turbine manufacturers to stimulate NGCC innovation in the 1990s. 
Through econometric analysis, I find that the DOE-ATS program affected the two participants, 
GE and SWPC, differently. Towards the end of the program, GE increased patent volume and 
sustained the higher level for several years following the program. SWPC, on the other hand, did 
not increase patenting volume but rather had higher impact patents (i.e. higher citations) during 
the early years of the program. This suggests that public-private partnership design and 
evaluation should consider the intended impact of a program on participants separately. 
Additionally, I use both a global sample of patents authorized anywhere in the world, and patents 
that were only authorized in the US, and the results vary between the two samples. Researchers 
may be tempted to only consider the local impact of a domestic program measured by domestic 
patents. However, this study finds that the domestic sample does not fully capture global 
innovation, and international patents should be evaluated (when available) for a truer sense of a 
program’s impact on innovation. The patent analysis conducted in this study provides 
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quantitative information on the impact of the program on NGCC patenting. Future research 
should conduct more qualitative research, through interviews with program participants and 
patent content analysis, to further investigate why the program affected each participant 
differently, and how the program patents translated into commercialized technologies. This 
information will provide more details to future program participants on how to design and 
evaluate public-private partnerships designed to stimulate innovation for complex technologies. 
 Chapter 3 evaluates the impact of environmental policy anticipation on rapid deployment 
of improved NGCC technology in the early 2000s. Using an econometric analysis of natural gas 
capacity data, I find that firms in areas anticipating ozone and particulate matter nonattainment 
built more natural gas capacity before nonattainment regulations took place. Since natural gas 
capacity is cleaner than coal generation, firms acted in advance of regulation to either reduce the 
chance of nonattainment designation, or to avoid stricter building regulations that result from 
nonattainment regulations. In this case, this was not an adverse anticipatory reaction to new 
policy, but rather anticipatory action with environmental benefits. For those crafting and 
evaluating policy, this study shows it is also important to consider the impact of a policy even 
before implementation. Despite significant variables measuring policy anticipation, the overall 
variance of natural gas capacity growth explained by the model is low. Future research should 
consider the impact of anticipation of additional policies that took place in the late 1990s, such as 
the Kyoto Protocol, which may have also contributed to an expectation of future environmental 
regulations. 
 In Chapter 4, I evaluate the impact of environmental policies and natural gas prices on 
NGCC utilization. Despite capacity expansion discussed in Chapter 3, new NGCC units had low 
utilization rates and were generally not used for baseload power. Over time, NGCC utilization 
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gradually increased and continues to grow. In this study, I evaluate the relative contributions of 
low natural gas prices and environmental policy on NGCC utilization, finding that the 
environmental policies had three times the effect of low natural gas prices on growing NGCC 
utilization. This shows that policy and market forces matter, and exclusion of either when 
designing and evaluating policy could lead to inaccurate conclusions. This study also cautions 
against the use of uniform utilization targets for NGCC generators since the age of the plant and 
weather conditions also affect utilization. Despite recent gains in NGCC utilization, overall 
utilization of these generators remains low. Future research should consider why NGCC in most 
places continues to provide power for marginal demand, and how to incentivize higher utilization 
in areas with coal generation and higher pollution. 
2. The Future of NGCC and Renewables 
 While this dissertation focuses on developments over the last thirty years for NGCC, the 
future of NGCC—including innovation, capacity growth, and utilization—will largely be shaped 
by its relationship to renewable generation. Intermittent renewable generation and capacity 
continues to increase in the US, with more than half of the capacity additions in 2016 coming 
from wind and solar.90 Because of NGCC’s flexibility and quick start-up and shut-down time, 
NGCC is expected to play an important role complementing intermittent renewables as their 
contributions to the electricity sector grow. The improvements in NGCC efficiency, cost 
competitiveness, and emissions reductions that occurred in the 1990s allowed new NGCC units 
to move into the role of baseload power providers. Today, there is growing interest in improving 
NGCC ramp speeds to better complement the growing use of intermittent renewable generators. 
The patent analysis of the DOE-ATS public-private partnership in Chapter 2 provides insights on 
                                                          
90 EIA Today in Energy, January 10, 2017: https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=29492. 
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advanced NGCC patenting, and factors to consider while assessing the need for future programs 
and policies targeting the next round of NGCC innovation.  
 Similarly, NGCC capacity growth in the future will likely be more heavily influenced by 
the location of intermittent renewable capacity. Chapter 3 found anticipation of traditional 
environmental policy impacted NGCC investment in the past. Today, politics has become even 
more partisan leading to more frequent and longer regulatory delays. It will be interesting to 
consider how renewable and climate policy anticipation, which are more political and uncertain, 
may impact NGCC capacity growth and investment going forward.  
 Last, there are many potential consequences of the relationship between NGCC and 
intermittent renewables for NGCC utilization. In my study of NGCC utilization (Chapter 4), I 
control for renewable capacity without further evaluating the specifics of the relationships, which 
is currently an evolving area of research with inconclusive findings thus far. Since I find policy 
in addition to market forces influence NGCC utilization, future research should consider the role 
of renewable policies on NGCC utilization.  
 My dissertation discusses the impact of three decades of energy and environmental 
policies on NGCC. This research is focused on NGCC in the US, but includes implications for 
other sources of generation, countries, and policies. I have used various data and methods to 
evaluate multiple types of energy and environmental policies, including government sponsored 
research programs, command-and-control environmental regulations, market-based policies, and 
regional greenhouse gas policies. New types of policies, not yet conceived, will influence the 
future of energy generation. New methods and analyses will be integral to prediction and 
assessment. Through it all, evidence-based policy research will remain necessary for measuring 
and shaping future policy decisions.
 
130 
VITA 
Kelly A. Stevens 
 
426 Eggers Hall                            kastev01@syr.edu 
Syracuse, NY 13244            https://kastev01.expressions.syr.edu 
(850) 445-6094 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 
Syracuse University 
Ph.D. expected June 2017, Public Administration, The Maxwell School of Citizenship and 
Public Affairs, Syracuse University 
Fields of specialization: Environmental Policy and Management; Science and Technology Policy 
Dissertation Committee: Peter Wilcoxen, David Popp, Sarah Hamersma, W. Henry Lambright, 
Inês Azevedo (Carnegie Mellon University) 
 
Carnegie Mellon University 
Visiting Student, Engineering and Public Policy, August 2015- present 
 
Florida State University 
MPA, Public Administration, 2012. Specialization: Environmental Management 
 
Florida State University 
MS, Meteorology, 2009. Advisor: Paul Ruscher 
 
State University of New York at Oneonta 
BS, Meteorology, 2004. Minor in Earth Science and Mathematics, magna cum laude 
 
PROFESSIONAL APPOINTMENTS 
 
Research Assistant, Center for Policy Research; Center for Environmental Policy and  
Administration, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 
August 2012-present 
Meteorologist, Florida Department of Environmental Protection, Division of Air Resource  
Management, Office of Policy and Program Analysis, November 2007-July 2012 
Teaching Assistant, Florida State University, Meteorology Department, August 2004 –  
November 2007 
Hurricane Intern. Florida Division of Emergency Management, Emergency Operations Center,  
May 2006-August 2006. 
Program for Instructional Excellence Associate, Florida State University, Center for Teaching  
and Learning, June 2005 – June 2006 
 
 
131 
PUBLICATIONS 
 
Papers 
 
Stevens, K.A. & Ruscher, P. (2014). Large Scale Climate Oscillations and Mesoscale Surface 
Meteorological Variables in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin. Journal of 
Hydrology, 517, 700-714. 
 
Bowman, J., & Stevens, K.A. (2013). Public Pay Disclosure in State Government: An Ethical 
Analysis. The American Review of Public Administration, 43(4), 4476-492. 
 
Stevens, K. A., DeAngelo, G., & Brice, S. (2011). Comparative study of selected greenhouse gas 
offset protocols. International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management, 3(2), 118 
– 139. 
 
Book Chapters 
 
Stevens, K.A. (2017). Organizational Understanding of the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency’s “Unfinished Business.” In G. Magill & K. Aramesh (Eds.),  The Urgency of Climate 
Change: Pivotal Perspectives. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 
 
Reports 
 
Stevens, K.A., DeAngelo, G., & Brice, S. (2010). Comparative Study of Selected Offset 
Protocols for Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Reporting Programs. Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection Division of Air Resource Management, Office of Policy Analysis and 
Program Management. 
 
Working Papers 
 
Stevens, K.A. Feasibility of Natural Gas Combined Cycle Utilization Targets: Evidence from 
Environmental Policies and Prices. Revise and Resubmit at the Energy Journal. 
 
Stevens, K.A. Policy Anticipation and Capacity Investment: New NAAQS and the Natural Gas 
Capacity Boom. Working paper. 
 
Stevens, K.A. Natural Gas Combined Cycle Innovations in the US: The Impact of the Advanced 
Turbine System Program. Working paper. 
 
PRESENTATIONS 
 
1. Stevens, K.A. (2016). Feasibility of Natural Gas Combined Cycle Utilization Targets. 
Evidence from Policy and Prices. United States Association of Energy Economics. Tulsa, 
OK. 
2. Stevens, K.A. (2016). Utilization of Natural Gas Capacity in Response to U.S. EPA’s 
Clean Power Plan. Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management Regional 
Student Conference. Washington, D.C. 
 
132 
3. Stevens, K.A. (2015). Utilization of Natural Gas Capacity in Response to U.S. EPA’s 
Clean Power Plan. Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management. Miami, FL.  
4. Stevens, K.A. (2015). Understanding the 2001-2003 Boom in Natural Gas Capacity in the 
U.S. Electricity Sector. United States Association of Energy Economics. Pittsburgh, PA. 
October, 2015. 
5. Stevens, K.A. (2015). Organizational Understanding of the U.S. EPA’s ‘Unfinished 
Business.’ Duquesne University Presidential Conference on the Integrity of Creation: 
Climate Change. Pittsburgh, PA. September, 2015. 
6. Stevens, K.A. (2015). Understanding the 2001-2003 Boom in Natural Gas Capacity in the 
U.S. Electricity Sector. Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 4th 
Annual Summer Conference. San Diego, CA. June, 2015. 
7. Stevens, K.A. (2015). Utilization of Natural Gas Capacity in Response to the US Clean 
Power Plan. Seventh International Conference on Climate: Impacts and Responses. 
Vancouver, BC. April, 2015. 
8. Stevens, K.A. (2015). Utilization of Natural Gas Capacity in Response to the U.S. Clean 
Power Plan. Syracuse University Interdisciplinary Graduate Research Symposium. 
Syracuse, NY. March, 2015. 
9. Stevens, K.A. (2014). Decomposing the 2001-2003 Boom in Natural Gas Capacity in the 
U.S. Electricity Sector. Syracuse University Interdisciplinary Graduate Research 
Symposium. Syracuse, NY. March, 2014. 
10. Stevens, K. A., DeAngelo, G., and Brice, S (2010). Offset Protocols and Florida Cap and 
Trade Programs. 14th Annual Power Generation Conference. Orlando, FL. July, 2010.  
11. Stevens, K. A., and Ruscher, P. (2008). Drought and its Relationship to Long-term 
Climatological Indicators in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin. 
University of Florida Water Institute Symposium. Gainesville, FL. February, 2008.  
12. Stevens, K. A., and Ruscher, P. (2008). Drought and its Relationship to Long-term 
Climatological Indicators in the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin. 88th 
Meeting of the American Meteorological Society, Conference on Hydrology. New 
Orleans, LA. January, 2008.  
 
GRANTS & FELLOWSHIPS 
Maxwell Dissertation Fellowship: 2015-2016 
USAEE Student Registration Fee Scholarship: 2015, 2016 
Syracuse University Graduate Student Organization Travel Grant: 2015 
Maxwell PAIA Summer Research Grant: 2013-2016 
Center for Environmental Policy and Administration Summer Research Grant: 2013,2014 
 
Contributions to Other Grant Work 
1. “Cybersecurity risks of dynamic, two-way distributed electricity markets.” National Science 
Foundation. Data processing of high-frequency electricity demand data by households. 2017. 
2. “Third-Party Evaluation of Say Yes in Buffalo.” The Say Yes to Education Foundation. 
Completed work using Geographic Information Systems for data analysis. 2015-2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
133 
TEACHING EXPERIENCE 
Public Administration 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) for Social Science (mini-course, Fall 2014, Instructor); 
Incoming MPA Math Review (Summer 2014, Instructor), Climate Change: Science, Perception 
and Policy (Spring 2014, TA); Executive Leadership (Summer 2014-2017, TA) 
 
Meteorology 
Meteorological Instruments and Observations Lab (Instructor), Introduction to Meteorology Lab 
(Instructor), Introduction to Meteorology (TA), Introduction to Climatology (TA), Synoptic II 
Lab (TA)  
 
OTHER PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES 
Academic Services 
Reviewer: Public Personnel Management, International Journal of Climatology 
Syracuse University Future Professoriate Program member, 2013-2015 
Listserv and website manager of Maxwell’s Energy and Environmental Policy Research group: 
2013-2015 
 
AWARDS/DISTINCTIONS 
Academic 
Graduate Scholar Award for Climate Change Impacts and Responses Conference, 2015 
Phi Eta Sigma National Honor Society 
Chi Alpha Sigma National College Athlete Honor Society 
Omicron Delta Kappa National Leadership Honor Society 
Chi Epsilon Pi National Honor Society in Meteorology 
National Soccer Coaches Association of America Scholar All-East 2nd Team, 2003 
Oneonta State Scholar Athlete of the Year, 2003 
Academic All-District 1 First Team, 2003 
Verizon Academic All-District 1 Third Team, 2002 
 
Other 
Oneonta State Athletic Hall of Fame, 2014 
NCAA DIII Indoor Track All-American, 2004 
NCAA DIII Women’s Soccer National Champion, 2003 
 
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS 
 
Association of Public Policy Analysis and Management 
International Association for Energy Economics 
United States Association for Energy Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
June 2017 
 
